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Marketa Trimble
CITEAS: 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 66 (2017)
ABSTRACT

With copyright law in the United States lying primarily in the realm of
federal law, the laws of the U.S. states concerningcopyright do not typically attract
significantattentionfrom scholars,practitioners,and policy makers. Some recent
events have drawn attention to state copyright laws-for example, litigation
against a satellite radio providerfor infringement of state common-law public
performance rights in pre-1972 sound recordings. However, in general, state
copyright laws remain largely in the shadow of federal copyright law, and state
law is typically not viewed as a particularlyuseful vehicle for pursuingthe policies
that copyright law should support. Yet, when used effectively, state copyright law,
together with state law in other areas such as contract, tax, employment, and
environmental law, may assist states in promoting state interests in innovation
and creativity. This articleexplores the limits of state law concerning copyright
and uses four copyright-related statutes of the State of Nevada to analyze
problems that arise in current state copyright law. State legislatures should not
only remedy the problems in state copyright law but should revise state laws to
best benefit states' interests in innovation policies, taking into account
developments in intellectual property law. The article reviews some of the
developments that should be on the radar of state legislators as they revise their
states' copyright laws.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright law in the United States falls primarily in the domain of
federal law; however, individual U.S. states (the "states") do have state
laws that concern copyright. The preemption doctrine, as applied to
copyright law, leaves some space in which state copyright law may
exist-both as a remnant of common law and as state statutory law.1
This article focuses on state copyright-related statutes, their current
condition, and their hidden potential as tools for state policies. The
article has two goals: first, to illustrate the problems that currently exist
in state copyright legislation and suggest why and how the statutes
should be updated to serve state interests in promoting innovation and
creativity; and second, to explore recent trends in state and federal
intellectual property ("IP") law that state legislatures should be aware of
as they consider revising their state statutes concerning copyright.
State laws that concern IP are typically not thought of as useful
vehicles for the implementation of state policies to attract innovation
and creativity ("innovation policies"), particularly with regard to
copyright and patent laws, which lie largely in the realm of federal law,
are shaped by federal policies, and are therefore non-controllable
starting points for state innovation policies that leave limited leeway for
the effects of state law. Yet, state IP law should not be ignored when
states implement innovation policies, and state IP-related statutes
should be up to date and should correspond to the innovation policies

1. See infra Part I, Section A for a discussion of the preemption doctrine.
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that a state wishes to pursue.
Of course, successful innovation policies do not rely solely on welldesigned and carefully balanced IP laws; 2 in fact, some critics may argue
that the role of IP laws is negligible. Studies concerning developments
in the United States and in foreign countries question whether IP
statutes actually affect innovation, or affect innovation in the manner
intended by the drafters of the statutes. 3 Additionally, there seems to be
little room for legislative creativity; international law creates a general
framework for national IP laws, setting a common denominator that is,
at least as far as the laws on the books are concerned, shared by most
countries in the world, and permits little national and/or state
experimentation. 4 Nevertheless, international law does provide space
for differences in national IP laws, and these differences can influence
the course of innovation in the fields of science and technology and in
particular industries. 5
It is important to recognize that IP laws are far from being the only
laws that affect innovation and other creative activities; contract, labor,
employment, environmental, and tax laws, among others, have
significant impacts on innovation, some influencing innovation
arguably even more than IP laws. 6 In addition to laws as such, an
effective judicial system and the reliable enforcement of laws can create
a high degree of legal certainty that also supports an environment that
might be conducive to innovation. Extra-legal aspects are also crucial

2. IP laws need to be well-balanced in order to contribute to an appropriate
environment for innovation. Finding the proper balance is difficult, and a
discussion of the balance is beyond the scope of this article. While Anupam Chander
is correct that "overly rigid intellectual property laws can prove a major hurdle to
Internet innovations," overly flexible or unenforceable IP laws may discourage
innovation and creativity in other areas, including the innovation and creativity
without which no internet venture could exist. Anupam Chander, How Law Made
Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 643-44 (2014).
3. See, e.g., Mario Cimoli et al., Innovation, Technical Change, and Patents in the
Development Process: A Long-Term View, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPMENT 57 (Mario Cimoli et al. eds. 2014);
Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Goodfor Developing Countries?Lessons from the U.S.
Experience, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
FOR DEVELOPMENT 201 (Mario Cimoli et al. eds. 2014).
4. On international law and intellectual property, see infra Part I, Section C.
5. Differences may exist among countries' IP statutes, interpretation of the
statutes, procedural norms, and other aspects of national law and practice.
6. E.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructureof High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
575 (1999); Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property:Human CapitalLaw and the Reach
of Intellectual Property, 93 TEx. L. REV. 789 (2015); James Pooley & Mark Lemley,
CaliforniaRestrictive Employee Covenants After Edwards, 23 CAL. LAB. &EMP. L. REV.,
Jan. 2009, at 3.
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for propelling and sustaining innovation and creativity;7 various
incentives, such as grants, prizes, and tax breaks, and factors such as the
availability of skilled workers, natural resources, a suitable geographical
location, attractive living conditions, and a quality educational system
also help create an environment that nurtures innovation and
8
creativity.
Given the multitude of factors that affect innovation and creativity
and the complexity of the interaction of the various factors, it might
seem that state IP laws would play only a negligible role in pursuing
state innovation policies. However, it is precisely because a successful
implementation of the policies must rely on a complex mosaic of
multiple and varied components that state legislators should not ignore
state IP laws. States should give attention to their IP statutes,
particularly when competing with other states for corporate locations
and relocations, startups, inventors, and creative activity that will
augment the state tax base.
This article illustrates the existing challenges that state legislatures
face in IP law by considering examples of statutes from the State of
Nevada. Nevada is an instructive example for two reasons: First, the
state has been keen on spurring innovation and creativity; for decades,
Nevada officials have reiterated the state's desire to attract innovative
businesses from other states, particularly neighboring California. 9 The
most recent economic downturn, which began in 2007 and was
particularly pronounced in Nevada, made the diversification of the
Nevada economy, and particularly diversification that draws on
innovative industries, a high priority for the state.
The second reason for which Nevada is a useful example is that the
Nevada legal system suffers from structural problems that make it
necessary to rely primarily on state legislation to develop state law.
Because of the lack (until recently) of an intermediate appellate court,
Nevada has had no robust development of state law through appellate
decisions. Before 2015, all appeals in Nevada were decided by a seven-

7. Cf Chander, supra note 2, at 642 (arguing that "[1]aw played a far more
significant role in Silicon Valley's rise and its global success than has been
previously understood.").
8. Certainty about the business environment may sometimes be more
important than reliable law enforcement; as lessons from foreign countries suggest,
as long as certainty is achieved through some means-even if it be extra-legal
means-the environment created might be conducive to business and innovation.
See, e.g., Eric Priest, Acupressure: The Emerging Role of Market Ordering in Global
Copyright Enforcement, 68 SMU L. REV. 169 (2015).
9. See, e.g., S.B. 395, Assemb. Comm. Judiciary, May 12, 1983 ("If the state is
successful in attracting more [computer] companies ....
this bill will help to give the
legal protections necessary for these companies. Thus, it will be helpful in the
promotion of high tech.").
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member Supreme Court; the situation changed only in early 2015 when
the newly-established Court of AppealsIO began to hear appeals.
However, the new court might not be able to improve the situation
significantly; the Court of Appeals has been operating under a deflective
model1 1 with only three judges on the Court. 12 Because insufficient
numbers of cases are making their way through the courts, and
particularly through the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the
focus of lawmaking in Nevada must logically shift to the legislature.
However, Nevada's legislature operates under severe time constraints:
it is one of only four U.S. state legislatures that still meet only
biennially. 13 This legislative model makes it difficult to react swiftly to
developments in law and practice, particularly when other more
pressing issues take precedence.
The selected Nevada statutes reviewed in this article are examples
of phenomena that exist in many other states, and the article points out
examples from other states throughout its analysis. The first section
reviews the space in which states may legislate on copyright; the outer
limits of the space are delineated by the preemption doctrine, the
dormant Commerce Clause, the international commitments of the
United States, and State Constitutions. Additional factors that influence
the content and character of state legislation are mentioned as well. The
second section of the article is divided into three subsections that
discuss four selected Nevada statutes concerning copyright. Each
subsection introduces a statute or statutes, reviews the legislative
history of the statutes, explains their place within federal and
international IP law, and provides a comparative analysis of the
provisions with regard to their counterparts in other states' laws and
the laws of foreign countries. After a critical review of the statutes, each
subsection offers suggestions for amending the statutes. The third

10. NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 3A (West, Westlaw through the 2017 79th Regular
Session 2017); 1 NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 2A (2015). Overview of theAppellate Courts, NEV.
CTS.

(Nov. 18,

2016),

http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Court-Information/Overview-of-the-Supreme-C
ourt-andCourt-ofAppeals [https://perma.cc/L8XD-DGLG]. The Court of
Appeals was approved in 2014 but began to hear cases only in 2015. Id.

11. In a "deflective model," "all appeals are filed in the supreme court, which
then decides to transfer certain cases to the intermediate appellate court based on
established screening criteria." Martha C. Warner, Anders in the Fifty States: Some
Appellants'EqualProtection Is More Equal Than Others', 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 669
n.308 (1996).
12. Overview of the Appellate Courts, supra note 10.
13. The other three U.S. states are Montana, North Dakota, and Texas. Annual
Versus Biennial Legislative Sessions, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 4, 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/annual-versus-bienniallegislative-sessions.aspx [https://perma.cc/8GJ 9-JXQ4].
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section of the article discusses current developments in the United
States that concern state IP law related to copyright, and contemplates
the effects that these developments might have on a legislative
reconsideration of state statutes.
There are two limitations to the analysis in this article that need to
be mentioned. First, the article covers a number of topics that merit
discussion in a single- or multiple-volume work. In fact, many of the
topics mentioned in passing in this article have been covered in articles
of substantial length, monographs, and treatises. The goal of the article
is to suggest the range of state law issues; discussing the breath of the
examples provided by the four selected Nevada statutes in some detail
means that the article must abbreviate, to the minimum necessary for
sufficient background, discussions of many general topics, such as the
preemption doctrine and the dormant Commerce Clause. The article
refers to existing literature on such topics in the footnotes, and readers
are encouraged to pursue their interest in detailed discussions of the
topics in the cited literature.
The second limitation is that the article focuses on only four statutes
of one state and on selected statutes concerning only copyright; the
article does not attempt to discuss comprehensively all of the copyrightor IP-related statutes of all states, or even of the State of Nevada. It is
infeasible to analyze all state IP-related statutes in a single article or
cover all Nevada IP statutes in a single article. Additional Nevada
statutes exist that concern copyright law 14 and other areas of IP law;
more detailed statutes than those that concern copyright exist on
trademarks, trade secrets, and unfair competition.15 These other
statutes are no less significant for state innovation policies than the
provisions on copyright that are reviewed in this article.
The statutes analyzed in this article were selected because they are
the primary examples of copyright-related statutes that are ripe for-if

14. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 597.720 (2017) (Miscellaneous Trade Regulations
and Prohibited Acts-Works of Art); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.216 (2017) (Unlawful
operation of audiovisual recording function in a motion picture theater); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 205.910 (2017) (Unlawful use of television or radio signals ... ).
15. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §205.205 (2017) (Counterfeiting trade-mark or
design); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.210 (2017) (Selling, displaying or advertising goods
with false trademark); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.215 (2017) (Fraudulent registration of
trademark); NEV. REV. STAT. § 587.610 (2017) (Mislabeling, false or misleading
statements or advertising unlawful); NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 598 (2017) (Deceptive
trade practices); NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 600 (Trademarks, Trade Names and Service
Marks); NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 600A (Trade Secrets (Uniform Act)); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 603.040 (2017) (Unfair trade practices). Nevada also has a statute concerning
patents: NEV. REV. STAT. § 600.500 (2017) (Employer is sole owner of patentable
invention or trade secret developed by employee). For some discussion of NEV. REV.
STAT. ch. 598 see infra Part III, Section B.
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not in dire need of-amendments. The statutes are outdated to the
point that some of their provisions are misleading or are preempted by
federal law. The condition of the statutes is unfortunate because
commentators, without a knowledge of legislative history, might not
realize that the statutes were the result of an understandable and
16
rational legislative approach when they were enacted.
The four statutes need to be updated and improved to signal to
investors, innovators, creators, and businesses that Nevada is primed
for innovation, that it understands innovation-friendly laws and
processes, and that it is committed to maintaining an attractive
environment for sustainable business, innovation, and creativity.
Although some might argue that court interpretations can resolve some
of the problems created by outdated legislation, or that statutes are not
worth legislative effort unless the issues in the statutes have reached the
courts, the message that businesses want to hear is legal certainty
through modern laws. In a state where judicial resources have been
strained, legislation is the only path for developing state law; it is also
the only path for a comprehensive review of state laws-a review that
should be guided by the clearly defined needs, goals, and policies of the
state.

II. LIMITS OF STATE COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION
State copyright statutes exist within a space that is, like that of other
state statutes, constrained by several forces: at the federal level, the
preemption doctrine and the dormant Commerce Clause limit the reach
of state laws, and international law that binds the United States also
shapes the space for state laws. General constitutional requirements
stemming from both the federal Constitution and a state's Constitution
also affect state laws. 17 Moreover, canons of statutory interpretation
and best practices of legislative work should be reflected in any
legislative effort, and legal certainty, clarity, and preservation of
legitimate expectations are among the principles that legislators should
pursue. This section presents an overview of the federal preemption
doctrine, the dormant Commerce Clause, and international law that
provides a background for the discussion of the four Nevada IP statutes
that follows in Part II.

16. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of an IP-related provision in the Nevada Constitution see
infra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
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A. Preemption

Copyright laws lie in the realm of U.S. federal law pursuant to the
IP Clause of the U.S. Constitution, according to which "[tihe Congress
shall have power.., to promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries." 18 The Supremacy
Clause dictates that federal law shall prevail over state law, and the
preemption doctrine safeguards the supremacy of federal law. 19
Although copyright laws are largely a product of federal law, courts have
not found copyright law to be subject to field preemption that would
entirely exclude state law on copyright. 20 There is therefore some, albeit
limited, space for state legislation. However, identifying what federal
21
law has left to the states to legislate is often a difficult task.
The space for state copyright law is carved out by an express
preemption provision 22 that has been included in Section 301 of the
1976 Copyright Act. 2 3 The preemption provision calls for an
assessment of two aspects-subject matter and rights. The subject
matter covered by a state law must "not come within the subject matter
of copyright," 24 nor must the rights provided by the state law be
"equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright." 25 Although Section 301 was adopted to clarify the

18. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. On the scope of the IP Clause of the U.S.
Constitution see, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright Lawmaking Authority: An
(Inter)NationalistPerspective on the Treaty Clause, 30 CoLuM.J.L. &ARTS 355 (2007);
Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause's ExternalLimitations, 61 DUKE L.J.
1330 (2012).

19. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cI. 2.
20. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). For a definition of field preemption see Caleb Nelson,
Preemption, 83 VA. L. REv. 225, 227 (2000).
21. For a general discussion of preemption and federal patent and copyright
law see Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of IntellectualProperty
Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REv. 111, 137-42 (1999).
22. For a definition of express preemption see Nelson, supra note 20, at 22627.

23. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2015). For a detailed discussion of the express preemption
provision in § 301 see Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption
Provision of the CopyrightAct of 1976, 10 VAND.J. ENT. &TECH. L. 1, 15-106 (2007).
For a discussion of the legislative history of § 301 see Howard B. Abrams, Copyright,
Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory Limits of State Law
Protection, 11 SuP. CT. REV. 509, 537-50 (1983).

24. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2015).
25. Id. See also, e.g., Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1137-38
(9th Cir. 2006); Kodadekv. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir.
1998).
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preemption doctrine in copyright law, 2 6 it has not-and realistically
probably could not have-achieved perfect clarity.27
Because the 1976 Act was designed to eliminate the duality of
federal copyright for published works and state copyright for
unpublished works by subsuming both published and unpublished
works under federal copyright, 28 the Act expressly preempts state law
on unpublished works. 2 9 State statutes are also preempted if they
extend to works of the same "general subject matter categories" as the
Act 30 but the works have "fail[ed] to achieve Federal statutory copyright
because [they were] too minimal or lacking in originality to qualify [for
federal protection], or because [they have] fallen into the public
domain., 3 1 For example, states cannot provide copyright protection for
factual information contained in a book 32 or for the non-original
aspects of databases; 33 nor may they legislate extensions to the
copyright term set by federal law, 3 4 because these extensions would
impermissibly constrain the public domain.
States may legislate on works that are not protected under federal
copyright because the works do not fall within the subject matter
covered by the Act 3 5 and/or are not fixed in a tangible medium of
expression. 3 6 While it might be difficult to think of a subject matter not
covered by the Act,3 7 it is easier to picture examples of unfixed works,
such as unfixed performances, in whose protection state legislation can

26. REP. COMM.JUDICIARY, S.REP. No. 93-983, at 165 (1974) ("The declaration

of [the preemption] principle in section 301 is intended to be stated in the clearest
and most unequivocal language possible..."). See REP.COMM.JUDICIARY, S.REP. No.
94-473 (1975), at 114.
27. Bauer, supra note 23, at 2 (noting that "this goal has never been realized.
Instead, there are literally hundreds of federal and state decisions interpreting
[ 301], which can charitably be described as inconsistent and even incoherent.").
28. See, e.g., REP. COMM.JUDICIARY, S.REP. No. 91-1219, at 4 (1970).

29. For a detailed discussion of the subject matter problems of preemption see
Abrams, supra note 23, at 559-66.
30. Protectable subject matter is defined in 17 U.S.C. % 102-103 (2015).
31. H.R.REP.No.94-1476,at129-33(1976).
32. Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds 471 U.S. 539 (1985). See also National Basketball Assoc. v.
Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting the "partial
preemption" doctrine).
33. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
34. 17 U.S.C. % 302-305 (2015). But cf.Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
560-61 (1973). On Congress' decision not to permit perpetual copyright for pre1972 sound recordings see H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 133 (1976).
35. 17U.S.C.§§ 102-103 (2015).
36. 17U.S.C.§ 102(2015).
37. See infra Part II, Section C for a discussion of one example.
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play an important role. 38 States can also, until February 1 5, 2067,
legislate on sound recordings that were fixed in a tangible medium
before February 1 5, 1972-the date on which federal law began
39
protecting sound recordings.
States may adopt laws concerning works that fall within the
federally protected subject matter, are original works of authorship, are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and are not in the public
domain, but only if the laws concern rights that are not "equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights" specified in sections 10640 and 106A of the
Act.

41

It can be difficult to ascertain when state law does or does not afford
rights "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights" in sections 106 and
106A of the Act. 4 2 For example, it might seem that federal copyright law
should not preempt state law on trade secrets misappropriation, but the
situation looks quite different when the trade secrets consist of a
computer program-which is a subject matter protectable under
federal copyright law-and the misappropriation occurs through
copying of the computer program. 4 3 In Computer Associates,4 4 the court
held that although the subject matter of protection was identical, the
state trade secrets law was not preempted because "the violation of a
duty of confidentiality established by state law" for misappropriation of
trade secrets is an "extra element [that] renders the state right

38. Id.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2015). Sound Recordings Act, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85
Stat. 39 (Oct. 15, 1971). See also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973);
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 91-1219, at 4 (1970); COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, S. REP. No.93-983, at 166 (1974).

40. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)-(b)(3)(2015).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (f)(2015). Note that by referring to % 106 and 106A, the
Act leaves aside other rights that might stem from the Act-for example, the right
to prevent the access that exists under some Circuits' interpretations of 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (2015). See Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of
the Evasion of Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 567, 618-

20 (2012). The preemption provision also specifically leaves undisturbed state laws
on "state and local landmarks, historic preservation, zoning, or building codes,
relating to architectural works protected" under the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C.
§ 301(b)(4) (2015), referring to 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2015). Thus, presumably, a
state could legislate, for example, that a state landmark that is a work of architecture
must not be photographed without a license; such provisions would exclude the
work from the application of the exception that otherwise permits pictorial
representations of architectural works that are protected by copyright and are
"located or ordinarily visible from a public place." 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (2015).
42. For a detailed discussion of the difficulties of ascertaining whether state
law-based rights are equivalent to the exclusive rights in % 106 and 106A see
Abrams, supra note 23, at 550-59.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015) (defining "computer program").
44. Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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qualitatively distinct from the federal right."45 An extra element was
also present in a state law-based claim for breach of an implied-in-fact
contract; compared to a claim of copyright infringement under federal
law, the contractual claim in the case included an extra element of a
promise to pay, and therefore the court held that the claim was not
46
preempted.
The assessment of equivalency of rights is also difficult when a state
law-created right is not on its face equivalent to a federally created right
but does in fact create a state exception on top of a federal exception to
a federal right (in fact, an exception to an exception). The California
resale right statute was an example. 4 7 The right entitled authors to
receive a portion of a price paid for their works when the works were
resold following the first sale of the works. The right might have been
formally viewed as not equivalent to any of the rights in sections 106
and 106A of the Copyright Act because the right is not listed in either
section. But the resale right is an exception to the federal first sale
doctrine (the first sale doctrine ensures that the right to distribute a
particular copy exhausts through the first sale of the copy), while the
federal first sale doctrine is an exception to the distribution right, which
itself is a right in section 106 of the Copyright Act. 4 8 By giving rights to
the author that extend beyond the first sale, the resale right diminishes
the effects of the exhaustion doctrine, and from this perspective the

45. Id. See also S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1090 n.13 (9th Cir.
1989); Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 303-04 (6th Cir. 2004);
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 93-983, at 166 (1974) (noting that rights
under state laws "would remain unaffected as long as the causes of action
contain[ed] elements ... that are different in kind from copyright infringement.");
COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 94-473, at 115 (1975).
46. Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001).
47. While resale right statutes exist in numerous countries, the United States
confers no federal resale right and only California ever had a state resale right
statute. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (1982). According to a document presented in the
World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), "more than 80 countries
recognize the resale right in their national legislations." Proposalfrom Senegal and
Congo to Include the Resale Right (droit de suite) in the Agenda of Future Work by the
Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights of the World Intellectual Property
Organization,SCCR/31/5, at 1 (Dec. 4, 2015). At the international level, the Berne
Convention includes a provision on the resale right ("droit de suite") but does not
mandate that countries introduce the right. Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 14ter, Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 1979. In
December 2015, Senegal and Congo proposed that a discussion of international
protection for droit de suite be placed on WIPO's agenda. See Proposal, supra.
Introduction of the resale right into the U.S. federal statutes has been discussed on
several occasions. On the California resale right statute see also infra Part I, Section
B.
48. 17U.S.C.§ 109(2015).
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resale right can be viewed as preempted. 4 9 This latter view was adopted
by the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, which
in 2016 held that the California Resale Royalty Act conflicted with the
first sale doctrine under the U.S. Copyright Act and was therefore
preempted.5 0
In addition to receiving scrutiny for express preemption by federal
copyright law, state statutes may also face scrutiny for implied
preemption by federal copyright law through what is known as conflict
preemption.5 1 Conflict preemption dictates that "state regulation of
intellectual property must yield to the extent that it clashes with the
balance struck by Congress in [the intellectual property] laws."15 2 For
example, the U.S. Supreme Court found a claim based on a state unfair
competition statute to be preempted when the statute would protect
against the copying of the design of a lamp that was protected by neither
federal patent nor federal copyright.5 3 In the same decision the Court
provided another example-this time in the patent law area-of the
application of the preemption doctrine when the Court also opined in
dicta that "[o]bviously a State could not.., extend the life of a patent
beyond its expiration date."15 4 The same would apply to copyright.
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
The dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which is a
mirror image of the Commerce Clause, also constricts states' ability to

49. For a different formulation of the argument in favor of preemption see
Gordon P. Katz, Copyright Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976: The Case of
Droit de Suite, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 200, 220 (1978) (arguing that "[d]roit de suite

aims to achieve exactly what the preemption provisions of the Copyright Act
proscribe-increasing the economic incentive to produce creative works by

augmenting the copyright monopoly").
50. Estate of Graham v. Sotheby's, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 974, 981-91 (C.D.

Cal. 2016). See also id. at 985 ("
[R]ecent precedent teaches that the first sale doctrine
does not simply create a void to be filled by state regulations."). The court analyzed
the state statute in light of both the express and the implied preemption doctrines.
51. For a general definition of conflict preemption see Nelson, supra note 20,
at 227-29. For a detailed discussion of conflict preemption in IP law see David
Hricik, Remedies of the Infringer: The Use by the Infringer of Implied and Common Law
Federal Rights, State Law Claims, and Contract to Shift Liability for Infringement of
Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, 28 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1027, 1076-83 (1997).
For a discussion of the relationship between express preemption and conflict
preemption in copyright law see Abrams, supra note 23, at 512, 549 ("There is also

the question whether the entire preemptive force of the statute is exhausted by
301.").
52. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989).
53. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
54. Id. In the copyright law context, see supra note 34.
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enact state laws, including copyright laws.55 The dormant Commerce
Clause prohibits states from "unjustifiably ...discriminat[ing] against
56
or burden[ing] the interstate flow of articles of commerce.1 It
prohibits state law from reaching extraterritorially and "precludes the
application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly
outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects
57
within the State."
A portion of the California resale statute that was mentioned above
was found to be in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.5 8 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the portion
of the statute that required the payment of resale royalties from sales of
fine art whenever the seller resided in California violated the dormant
Commerce Clause "as applied to out-of-state sales by California
residents."5 9 As noted in the previous Section, the portions of the statute
60
that survived the challenge based on the dormant Commerce Clause
were later held to be preempted by federal copyright law.
Interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause is particularly difficult
in cases that involve conduct on the internet or on other networks that
are accessible throughout the United States; 6 1 in fact, it is not difficult
to imagine that all state laws that affect activities on these networks
throughout the United States could be interpreted as being in violation
of the dormant Commerce Clause, 62 but that should not be the case. In
the IP context, the question of permissibility in light of the dormant
Commerce Clause of state legislation affecting conduct that occurs on
the networks was raised by Sirius XM Radio, Inc. in its litigation with
Flo & Eddie, Inc. Sirius argued that if a common law rule in New York
existed that afforded a public performance right to pre-1972
recordings, 6 3 "[a]pplying [the] New York performance right to Sirius
XM's nationally uniform broadcasts would have the practical effect of

55. U.S. CoNST.,Art. 1,§. 8, cI. 3.
56. Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 2002).
57. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
58. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (1982); Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784
F.3d 1320, 1326 (9th Cir. 2015).
59. Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir.
2015).
60. Id. at 1325-26 (discussing severability).
61. The term "internet" is used here in a general sense, not as a reference to a
particular protocol.
62. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith &Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 786-87 (2001).
63. See infra Part III, Section A for a discussion of state law on the public
performance right in pre- 1972 sound recordings.
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burdening interstate commerce.1 6 4
A decision in Flo & Eddie on the application of the dormant
Commerce Clause to state public performance rights in pre-1972
sound recordings could have affected the application of the dormant
Commerce Clause with respect to other state laws concerning activities
on the internet. The District Court judge held that a common law rule
in New York did provide for such rights 65 and that the rule as applied
in the case did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause because the
rule was not "directly regulating commerce in other states."16 6 On
appeal, Sirius urged the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to
apply the Pike test, the application of which would result in the
invalidation of the state law if "the burden imposed on [interstate]
commerce [by the law] is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. 67 However, in response to a question that the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified, the New York Court of
Appeals held that "New York common-law copyright does not
recognize a right of public performance.1 6 8 Therefore, this litigation did
not clarify the application of the dormant Commerce Clause to state
laws regulating activities on the internet. 6 9 Neither will a clarification
result from a case concerning a state law imposing a tax on internet
sales; the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case in December
2016.70
C. InternationalLaw

Another force that shapes the scope of state law is international
law. 7 1 International law binds the United States, and it is the federal

64. Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant Sirius XM Radio Inc. at "20, No. 151164-cv (2d Cir. Oct. 27, 2017), 2015 WL 6575734.
65. See infra Part III, Section A.
66. Flo &Eddie, Inc.v. SiriusXM Radio, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d 325, 349 (S.D.N.Y
2014).
67. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits.").
68. Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 28 N.Y.3d 583, 589 (2016).
69. Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 849 F.3d 14 (2d Cir. 2017).
70. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied
Dec. 12, 2016.
71. For a discussion of how the effects of international law on state law
intersect with the effects of the preemption doctrine and the dormant Commerce
Clause on state law see Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive
Power of InternationalLaw, 7 SuP. CT. REVIEW 295, 306-07, 335-36 (1994).
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government that enters into international treaties and is expected to
implement the treaties. 7 2 Through the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, international treaties have effects on state law;73 in some
cases, provisions of international treaties are self-executing, meaning
that parties may directly rely on such provisions in courts where the
provisions supersede any state law to the contrary. 7 4 Courts will
enforce treaties to remedy violations of the treaties that may occur
through the application of state laws that are incompliant with the
treaties; as Tim Wu has noted, this type of enforcement has been "the
primary and historically most significant type of treaty enforcement in
the United States."7 5 Wu also points out that the U.S. Supreme Court
"makes no effort to reconcile inconsistent State law and pays no special
76
attention to State interpretation of a treaty."1
A number of international treaties to which the United States is a
party concern IP and copyright specifically. In addition to numerous
bilateral agreements concluded by the United States, 7 7 the United States
has acceded to a number of international treaties, for example the
Universal Copyright Convention 7 8 and the Geneva Phonograms
Convention. 7 9 In 1988 the United States became a party to the Berne

72. On the interaction between the IP Clause and the Treaty Clause of the U.S.
Constitution see Dinwoodie, supra note 18.
73. For a discussion of whether international law is federal or state law, see
Brilmayer, supra note 71, at 302-04. "[U]nless otherwise explicitly so stated,
Congress should be presumed not to want the states to violate international law."
Id. at 333. See also CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL
SYSTEM 40 (2013).

74. Courts in the United States have held most IP treaty provisions not to be
self-executing in the United States. E.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135,
161 (2d Cir. 2007) ("TRIPs is plainly not a self-executing treaty."). See generally
Bradley, supra note 73, 41-44. For a case in which IP treaty provisions were found
to be self-executing see Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150
(1940); but cf. Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 128 (2d
Cir. 2000).
75. Tim Wu, Treaties'Domains,93 VA. L. REv. 571, 583-84 (2007).
76. Id. at 585.
77. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S.
COPYRIGHT

OFFICE,

CIRCULAR

3 8A,

2016,

http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ38a.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9SW- 9PPF].
78. Universal Copyright Convention, 1952. The United States signed the
Convention in 1952 and ratified it in 1954. See Other IP Treaties: UniversalCopyright
Convention
1952,
WIPO,
http:/ /www.wipo.int/wipolex/ en/other-treaties/parties.jsp?treaty-id= 208&grou
p.id=22 [https://perma.cc/B4CA-FVPE].
79. Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, 1971 ("Geneva Phonograms
Convention"). The United States signed the Convention in 1971 and ratified it in
1973.
See
WIPO-Administered
Treaties,
WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty-id= 18
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Convention 80 -the key international convention on copyright-and
since that time the U.S. role in international IP lawmaking has
intensified, with the U.S. government initiating, leading, and/or
strongly influencing negotiations on, as well as joining in, other
81
international IP treaties and trade treaties with IP law provisions.
When states legislate on matters governed by international treaties,
or when courts interpret state statutes or apply state common law on
such matters, the states are de facto participating in the implementation
of the treaties if a state law falls within the scope of an international
treaty. 8 2 For instance, the Berne Convention applies to both fixed and
unfixed works; however, it gives countries that are parties to the
Convention the option to decide whether or not they will protect
unfixed works. 8 3 To the extent that a contracting country does protect
unfixed works by copyright, the provisions of the Convention will apply
to such unfixed works. The U.S. Copyright Act does not protect unfixed
85
works, 84 and any protection for unfixed works is left to state law. If
state law protects unfixed works by copyright, the state law should
comply with the Berne Convention, to the extent that the Convention
covers the laws. For example, the Berne Convention's provision on
national treatment 86 applies to state statutes, meaning that state statutes
should ensure that foreign right holders "enjoy... the same rights as
87
national [right holders].1
State IP statutes typically neither mention nor refer to international
treaties on IP. A Delaware statute appears to be the sole exception in this

[https://perma.cc/W9MA-ZBZH].

80. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept.
9, 1896, S.TREATY DOC. NO. 99-17 (1986) (as revised at Paris onJuly 4, 1971,
and amended Sept. 28, 1979) [hereinafter "Berne Convention"].

81. E.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr.
15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter "TRIPS Agreement"]. On the
introduction of IP matters into trade treaties, see, e.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy
Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law Is
Reconceptualizing IntellectualProperty, 36 MICH.J. INT'L L. 557 (2015).
82. See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the
Berne Convention and the United States Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REv. 499, 505-08
& 519 (1967) (discussing examples in which U.S. compliance with international
treaties was achieved through state law).
83. Berne Convention, Art. 2(2).

84. 17U.S.C.§ 102(a) (2015).
85. See supra Part I, SectionA.
86. Berne Convention, supra note 80, Art. 5(3).
87. Id. Because the United States is also a party to the TRIPS Agreement, the
TRIPS Agreement's national treatment and most-favored-nation provisions also
apply. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81, Art. 3 and 4.

STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW

Vol. 20:2

regard; its provision against unauthorized "[t]ransfer of sounds"18 8
mentions the Geneva Phonograms Convention. 8 9 The statute limits the
protection it affords to an "owner [who] is domiciled or has its principal
place of business in a country which is a signatory to the [Geneva
Phonograms] Convention." 9 0 This limitation appears to be a unique
instance of a state statute limiting its beneficiaries based on the national
treatment mandated by an international IP treaty. 9 1 The Delaware
statute actually does not cover all "nationals" of the other contracting
states (a coverage that is required by the Convention); 9 2 nationals may
or may not have a domicile or principal place of business in the country
of their nationality. This inconsistency with the Geneva Phonograms
Convention is of little consequence for U.S. compliance with the
Convention, however; the Delaware statute is likely preempted by
93
federal law insofar as it would apply to post-1972 sound recordings,
and the statute as applied to pre- 1972 sound recordings is not within
the scope of the Geneva Phonograms Convention, which does not
94
mandate protection for pre- 1972 sound recordings.
Even if international treaties are de facto implemented by state,
rather than federal law, it is the federal government that will be held
responsible for any violations of international law. 95 Verifying the
compliance of state law with international treaties to which the United
States is a party is primarily the concern of courts; 96 Tim Wu has
observed that "courts show.., concern that allowing State breach might
create reciprocity concerns that only courts are in a good position to

88. See infra Part 1I,Section C for a discussion of similar statutes in other states,
including in Nevada.
89. Supra note 79.
90. 11 DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 920(a) (2017).
91. Geneva Phonograms Convention, supra note 79, Art. 2. For limitations in
federal copyright law see 17 U.S.C. § 104 (2015).
92. Geneva Phonograms Convention, supra note 79, Art. 2.
93. See supra Part I, Section A, and infra Part 1I,Section C, and Part ILL, Section
A.
94. Geneva Phonograms Convention, supra note 79, Art. 7(3). The United
States must apply the Convention to sound recordings fixed on or after March 10,
1974 (the date on which the Convention entered into force for the United States).
See

Phonograms

Convention:

Phonograms

Convention,

WIPO,

http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty-id= 18
[https://perma.cc/ZDQ2-FUKKI.
95. Brilmayer, supra note 71, at 334-335 ("[W]here the constituent states of
the Union violate international legal norms, the ultimate responsibility falls upon
the federal government."). In practice, it could theoretically be private persons and
entities that face the repercussions of a government's failure to comply with an
international IP treaty-for example, if another country suspended its national
treatment in retaliation for the failure.
96. Bradley, supra note 73, at 39-40.
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remedy.1 97 In general, a state's responsibility for compliance with
international treaties is a sensitive matter, given that it is the federal
98
government that enters into the treaties on behalf of the United States,
and yet in many areas of law, including IP law, the federal government
will rely on state law to comply with the treaties. For example,
compliance with the obligations of international law with respect to
trade secrets was until recently almost entirely in the hands of the
states; 9 9 similarly, proponents of U.S. compliance with the Berne
Convention have referred mostly to state law to show U.S. compliance
with the moral rights provisions of the Convention.10 0
While the federal government might rely on state law to secure U.S.
compliance with international IP law, state law can successfully avoid
being a vehicle for the implementation of international IP law by
legislating outside IP law categories. Treaties on IP law are limited in
scope; they cover IP law and IP rights, and not other areas of law or
other rights. Therefore, if a state statute relates to a matter covered by
an international IP treaty but the state does not categorize the statute as
an IP statute and does not formulate the relevant rights as IP rights, the
statute will be outside the scope of the treaty. 10 1 The state statute may
still, of course, be preempted by relevant federal law.

97. Wu, supra note 75, at 586.
98. State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) ("No doubt the
great body of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty
may override its power.").
99. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81,Art. 39. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2016); the
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016.
100. Berne Convention, supra note 80, Art. 6bis; S. Rep. No. 352, 100 Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 to 10 (1988); House Report of the Berne Convention Implementation
Act of 1988. H.R. Rep. No 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 to 40 (1988); Final Report
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention at 35,
39-42, reprinted in 10 Colum.J.L. &Arts 513, 547, 551-54 (1986). On state law
and moral rights see also Nimmer, supra note 82, at 520-523; Justin Hughes,
American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar "Gap," 3 UTAH L. REv. 659 (2007). See
also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81, Article 9(1) (excluding Article 6bis of the
Berne Convention from the scope of the TRIPS Agreement). Currently, U.S.
compliance with the provision on moral rights of performers under Article 5 of the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 1996, also must rely on state law. If
the United States ratifies the Beijing Treaty, the same issue will arise concerning
moral rights under Art. 5 of the Treaty. Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual
Performances,June 24, 2013 (hereinafter "Beijing Treaty"), Art. 5. See also infra Part
III, Section C.
101. See, in the international context, David Vaver, The National Treatment
Requirements of the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions, 17 IIC 577, 591 (1986).
Cf.Wilhelm Nordemann, The Principle of National Treatment and the Definition of
Literary and Artistic Works, 25 COPYRIGHT 300, 301 (1989).
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III. SELECTED NEVADA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW STATUTES
As Part I suggests, some space for state copyright legislation, though
limited, does exist. With the focus in copyright law being on federal
legislation, it is not surprising that state copyright legislation typically
attracts little attention, and state legislatures may often consider state
copyright law revisions to be of low priority. To illustrate the problems
that arise in current state copyright laws, the following three sections
review and analyze four selected Nevada statutes that concern
copyright; they are examples of statutes that exist, in some form, in
other states and reflect problems that other state legislatures should also
recognize and address.
Of all Nevada copyright-related statutes, the following four are
perhaps in the most urgent need of revision. Revisions should address
the aspects of the statutes that make them (a) outdated because of
changes that have occurred in federal copyright law since the statutes
were adopted (namely, the statutes in sections A and B below); (b)
misleading because the current state of federal copyright law causes the
statutes to appear as if they were drafted based on some confusion about
current federal copyright law (the statutes in sections B and C); and/or
(c) preempted by federal law (the statute in section C). The following
three sections do not propose any specific wording for possible
amendments, but the sections do suggest the considerations that might
influence the amendments; they also refer to statutes in other states that
might serve as models for the amendments.
A. Copyright to State Works
One area in which state legislation has a profound effect is the
copyright protection of state works, where state legislation defines how
state works may be utilized, and by whom. A state may become a
copyright owner in various ways. First, copyright in some works vests
directly in the state; these are works created as works for hire-either
works created by state employees within the scope of their
employment, 10 2 or specific types of works commissioned by the
state. 10 3 Second, a state may own copyright that did not automatically
vest in the state but that the state acquired later; for example, a state
might purchase copyright, inherit copyright, or obtain copyright in a

102. Exceptions might exist. See infra notes 108-110 and the accompanying text
for the difference between the rules for copyright of the U.S. federal government
and copyright of U.S. state governments.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015) (defining "work made for hire").
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bankruptcy. 10 4 This section concerns primarily works for which the
copyright ownership arose in the first manner; these works may include
reports, maps, and other documents created by state agencies, as well as
legislative materials. 105
As may every copyright owner, a state may decide how to handle its
copyrights; the state's treatment of its own copyrights should comport
to the nature and the mission of the copyright owner-the state. The
manner in which a state treats its copyrights should reflect the fact that
state works are typically created or acquired with the support of state
taxes and should benefit the residents of the state. 10 6 While the funding
of state copyrights through state taxes might justify the placing of state
works in the public domain for use by state residents and taxpayers
("state residents") and others, the placing of the works in the public
domain might not be justified in all instances-the role of the state as
custodian of its property also dictates that it utilize its works for the
benefit of its residents, which may be best achieved by maintaining
copyright protection for at least some works and creating a mechanism
for selective free utilization of the works by state residents. In many
instances, free utilization of all state works in all circumstances will
serve state residents best, but in other instances, the monetization of
copyrights in some state works will ultimately be the most beneficial
07
solution for state residents. 1
If a state wishes to limit its copyrights to state works, it may transfer
or license its copyrights in the same manner that other copyright
owners would; additionally, it may adopt laws to limit its copyright.
One way to limit copyright is to deny the existence of copyright
altogether; in this manner, copyright never vests and a work
automatically falls into the public domain. The U.S. Copyright Act
adopts this approach to U.S. Government works: under Section 105,
"[clopyright protection.., is not available for any work of the United
States Government." 108 While Section 105 prevents copyright from
vesting in U.S. Government works, it does not preclude the U.S.

104. For example, the State of Nevada became the owner of copyright to the
musical composition of "'Home' Means Nevada," the official state song, through an
assignment. Recorded by the U.S. Copyright Office in V2520P261, February 12,
1990.
105. For a discussion of state court decisions see infra notes 113-118 and the

accompanying text.
106. An Idaho state statute provides that "the state of Idaho and the taxpayers
shall be deemed to have a copyright on the Idaho Code." IDAHO CODE § 74-123(1)
(2015) (emphasis added).
107. See infra notes 182-184 and the accompanying text for a note regarding
public access and open records laws.

108. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2015).
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Government from "receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it
by assignment, bequest, or otherwise." 10 9
The U.S. Copyright Act includes no corresponding provision for
copyrights that vest or are otherwise owned by state governments, nor
does it include any provision specifically mentioning or precluding a
state from adopting a statute that would deprive state works of
copyright protection. In the absence of a federal statute that would
regulate the status and ownership of copyright to state works, copyright
to state works follows the default rules for other works that fulfill the
conditions for copyright protection. 1 10 Since March 1, 1989,111
copyright in such works has vested automatically, upon their fixation in
a tangible medium of expression, and the only way that copyright
owners (other than the U.S. Government) may limit their copyright is
to transfer or license the copyright. Although some courts have said that
copyright attaches to state works only if state governments "copyright"
them, this conclusion seems to stem from earlier case law that was based
112
on the pre- 1989 state of the Copyright Act.
In Nevada, the Nevada Constitution has provided, since its passage
in 1864, that "[a]ll laws and judicial decisions must be free for
publication by any person." 1 13 In the Nevada Constitutional
Convention debates, J. Neely Johnson1 14 called the provision "one of
the most commendable features of the section."1 15 He pointed out that
in California at that time, the Sacramento Union published California
Supreme Court decisions "within a day or two after a decision [was]
rendered," while it took several months for the decisions to appear in
the official California Reports. 116 Johnson argued that similar prepublication practices would be beneficial in the State of Nevada-an
approach to copyright in judicial decisions that was also in line with the

109. Id.

110.

17U.S.C. %102and 103(2015).

111. See infra for an explanation of the reason for the change in the law in 1989.
112. See, e.g., County. of Santa Clara v. Super. Ct., 170 Cal.App. 4th 1301, 1331 1336, as modified (Feb. 27, 2009) (citing Microdecisions, Inc. v. Skinner, 889 So.2d
871, 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), which cited County of Suffolk, New York v.
FirstAmerican Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 2001)).
113. NVCONST. Art. 15 § 8 (2016).
114. Patricia D. Cafferata, Back Story: Second Constitutional Convention, Part One,

NEVADA LAWYER, Feb. 2013 at 54 (J.NeelyJohnson of Ormsby County was a lawyer
who moved to Nevada from California and served as a delegate to the first and
second Nevada Constitutional Conventions in 1863 and 1864).

115. OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, ASSEMBLED AT CARSON
CITY, JULY 4TH, 1864, TO FORM A CONSTITUTION AND STATE GOVERNMENT 612, 613
(Andrewj. Marsh ed., 1866).
116. Id.
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approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court. 117 In 1834 the Court had
held that no copyright would vest in court decisions; the Court observed
that "copies of [court] decisions should be multiplied to any extent, and
in any form required" and that, in the case of court decisions,
"[plublicity is the very thing required."I 18 However, while federal law
now precludes copyright from vesting in federal government works,
including federal statutes, the Nevada Constitution creates a perpetual,
non-exclusive, royalty-free statutory license in Nevada statutes and
judicial decisions.
Most states have adopted statutes that allowed them to secure
copyright in some state works. Apparently, "the principal motivation
for the States to secure [copyright] in their publications [was] to enable
them to give exclusive rights to a private publisher to induce him to
print and publish the material at his own expense."I 19 It was also the
publishers of state reporters who in the early 1 900s opposed changes to
federal copyright law that would have deprived state works of copyright
protection. 120
In Nevada, the 1907 version of what became NRS 344.070
authorized the State Printer to "have all publications issued by the State
of Nevada copyrighted."1 2 1 A 1959 amendment changed the language
to authorize the State Printer to "secure copyright,"1 2 2 and other than
minor amendments to it enacted in 1969 and 2005, the provision,
entitled "Copyrights of State Publications," has remained the same until
today, stating, in relevant part, that "[tihe State Printer may secure
copyright under the laws of the United States in all publications issued
by the State of Nevada."1 2 3 Similarly, NRS 218F.730 provides, in

117. Id.

118. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 650 (1834).
119.

Caruthers Berger, Copyright in Government Publications, STUDY No. 33

PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF
THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE 36 (Oct. 1959),

http://www.copyright.gov/history/studies/study33.pdf.

See also Copyright Law

Revision: Hearing on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the

Administration of Justice of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 178 (1975) (a
letter from NASA pointing out that "copyright protection.., available for
Government works in exceptional circumstances ... would give NASA the
opportunity to enter into competitive negotiations with private publishing firms in
exceptional cases so that selected NASA publications could receive the widest

possible distribution...").
120. Arguments before the Committees on Patents:Hearingon S. 6330 and H.R. 19853
Before S. and H. conjointly, 59th Cong. 133-138 (1906). See also 2 Patry on Copyright
§ 4:63.

121. 1907

Nev.

Stat.

434.

See

also Curtis

Annotator, Nevada Compiled Laws 1929 § 7486 (1930).
122 1959 Nev.Stat. 11.
123. NEV. REV.STAT.§ 344.070 (2016):

Hillyer,

Compiler

and
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relevant part, that "[t]he Legislative Counsel is authorized to secure
copyright under the laws of the United States in all publications issued
by the Legislative Counsel Bureau." 124 NRS 218F.730 has undergone
only minor changes since it was adopted in 1971.125
The problem with the two current Nevada statutes on copyright in
state works is that starting on March 1, 1989, when the Berne
Convention Implementation Act came into effect in the United
States, 126 no specific act has been required to "secure copyright." The
Berne Convention, 127 to which the United States acceded in 1988,
requires that countries that are parties to the Convention abolish
formalities as a requirement for copyright protection. 1 28 Therefore, the
United States' ratification of the Berne Convention obligated it to
eliminate the formalities previously required by the U.S. Copyright Act
for copyright protection, which until that date were either copyright
registration or publication with a copyright notice. 12 9 Since the Berne
Convention Implementation Act has been in effect, copyright has vested
automatically, upon the fixation of a work in a tangible medium of
expression. Although Congress maintained in the federal law several
advantages for copyright owners who register their copyrights 130 and
publish their works with a copyright notice, 13 1 neither registration of a
work nor publication of a work with a copyright notice has been
necessary since March 1, 1989, for an author to obtain copyright

Copyrights of state publications.
1. The State Printer may secure copyright under the laws of the United States
in all publications issued by the State of Nevada, the copyright to be secured
in the name of the State of Nevada.
2. All costs and charges incurred in copyrighting such publications must be
charged against the State Printing Fund, and must be paid in the same way as
other charges are paid by the State.
124. NEV. REV. STAT. § 218F.730 (2016) ("Authority to secure copyrights.
1. The Legislative Counsel is authorized to secure copyright under the laws of the
United States in all publications issued by the Legislative Counsel Bureau. 2. Each
copyright must be secured in the name of the State of Nevada"). The statute was
originally adopted as NRS 218.698.
125. 2011 Nev. Stat. 3246.
126. The Berne Convention ImplementationAct of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
102 Stat. 2853.
127. Berne Convention, supra note 80.
128. Id., Art. 5(2). See also WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 20,
Dec. 20, 1996.
129. On the formalities in U.S. copyright law in general see Jane C. Ginsburg,
The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities:A Love/Hate Relationship, 33
COLUM.J.L. &ARTS 311, 322-342(2009).
130. See 17 U.S.C. % 205, 115, 410(c), 411(a), 412, and 603 (2015). See also 19
U.S.C. § 1337 (2015) (filing an action with the International Trade Commission).
131. See 17U.S.C.§401(d)(2015).
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protection. 132 Given how copyright vests, it is impossible to identify an
act required to "secure copyright" that would be separate from the act
13 3
of fixing a work in a tangible medium of expression.
Following the major change in U.S. copyright law effectuated by the
Berne Convention Implementation Act, the language of the Nevada
statutes on state copyrights is outdated; the statutes rely on an act to
"secure copyright" that is no longer required by U.S. law for copyright
to vest, although registration remains important for filing an
infringement action and provides certain advantages. Because
copyright is "secured" automatically through the fixation of a work, the
statutes can only be interpreted as moot because copyright vests
automatically upon fixation, leaving no work for the State Printer or the
Legislative Council to "secure copyright" to. The Nevada statutes are
permissive, suggesting that not all state works need to be protected by
copyright, but they provide no means to exclude from automatic
copyright protection any state works that are deemed appropriate for
the public domain.
Nevada is not the only state with laws that lag behind the changes
that were introduced into U.S. copyright law more than a quarter of a
century ago. 13 4 Other state statutes exist that speak of "securing
copyright" in state works; for example, some provisions in the
California Education Code use this language, 13 5 as do isolated
provisions of statutes in Maryland, 13 6 Texas, 137 Ohio, 13 8 and
Florida. 13 9 Other state statutes mention the act of "copyrighting," again
as though some act still exists that is required to create copyright

132. 17 U.S.C. § 41 1(a) (2015) (in the United States, copyright registration is
required for a U.S. work as a prerequisite to the filing of an infringement action in
court; however, registration is not required in order for copyright to vest).
133. Whether the elimination of formalities was a positive step is still debated,
but the point is moot if the Berne Convention is not revised and the United States
intends to comply with the Convention.
134. For comparisons of state laws on copyright to state works see, e.g.,JAMES G.
McEWAN ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS:
PROTECTING AND ENFORCING IP AT THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEVEL (Oxford
University Press 2d ed., 2012). A Harvard Library webpage gives an overview of
state approaches to copyright; however, it focuses on public access to public records
and is therefore of limited utility for the analysis in this article. Copyright at Harvard
Library,
(May
10,
2017),
http://copyright.lib.harvard.edu/states/
[https://perma.cc/QVZ6-2FYQ]. For the relationship of copyright and public
access to public records see infra notes 182-184 and the accompanying text.
135 CAL. EDUC. CODE % 1044, 32361, 35170, and 72207 (West 2017).
136. MD. CODEANN.,AGRIC. § 10-502(1) (West 2017); MD. CODEANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 13-203 (West 2017).
137. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 153.006(a)(6)(B) (2015).
138.

OHIO REV. CODEANN.

139.

FLA. STAT. § 943.146(2)(a) (2016).

149.17 and 2503.23 (2017).
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protection beyond the fixation of a work in a tangible medium of
expression; for example, the Alabama Code instructs the Code
Commissioner to have legislative acts "copyrighted for the use and
benefit of the state." 140 Similarly, acts of "copyrighting" appear in the
14 1 Colorado, 14 2
context of state works in isolated statutes in Arkansas,
14 6
14 5
144
14 3
Indiana, 14 7
Hawaii,
Georgia,
Florida,
Connecticut,
Kansas,148 Michigan,149 Minnesota,150 Mississippi,151 Missouri,152
156 Pennsylvania, 15 7
Montana,1 5 3 Nebraska, 154 Oklahoma,15 5 Oregon,
16
159
and Wisconsin. 0
Rhode Island, 15 8 South Dakota,
As the statutory provisions in these other states should, the two
Nevada statutes should be amended to correct the outdated language,
and, more importantly, reflect the State's needs and policies. Although
Nevada's current needs and policies should drive any amendments, the
original intent of the provisions and the practice associated with the
provisions provide a useful starting point for a reconsideration of the
statutes. Both statutes are permissive, suggesting that the Nevada
legislature did not expect for copyright to be secured in all State works;
others were intended to fall immediately into the public domain. A
1971 Opinion of the Nevada Attorney General confirms this
interpretation; it stated that "[sitate publications copyrighted in
compliance with the federal copyright statute as authorized by [now

140. ALA.CODE § 36-13-5 (2017).
141.

ARK. CODE ANN.

142. COLO.REV.STAT.
143.

144.
145.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

§ 6-20-205(a) (2017).
2-5-118 (2016).

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-216a(f) (2017).
FLA. STAT.§ 119.084(2) and (3) (2016).
GA. CODEANN. § 50-18-34 (2016).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 206M-34 (2016).
IND. CODE 5-11-1-19 (2016).
KAN. STAT.ANN. § 20-206 (2014).
MICH. ComP.LAWS§ 17.401 (2015).
MINN. STAT. § 14.47, Subd. 1(5) (2016); MINN. STAT.

§ 480.11, Subd. 3

(2016).
151. MISS. CoDEANN. § 25-43-2.101(6)(a) (2005).
152. MO.ANN. STAT.§630.095 (West 2011).
153. MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-11-304 (2017) ("The Montana Code Annotated,
supplements, or other publications ancillary thereto, as published, ...may not be
copyrighted").
154. NEB. REV. STAT. %24-212(1); 49-225; 49-707 (2017).
155. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 256(F)(1) (West 2017).
156. OR. REV. STAT. % 171.275(3); 173.770(1); 177.120(1); 183.360(1) (2017).
157. 49 PA. CONS. STAT. § 93; 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 636; 71 PA. CONS. STAT.
954; 71 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 1340.305(a)(7) (2017).

158. 1956 R.I. GEN.LAws 8-1-8 (2017).
159. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-16-8 (2017).
160. WIS.STAT.ANN.§ 39.115(1) (West2017).
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NRS] 344.070 have a legally binding copyright; all other state
publications are in the public domain after publication." 16 1 To date it
seems that the practice in Nevada has been to leave most state works in
the public domain; a search of post-1978 Nevada copyright
registrations reveals surprisingly few registrations made on behalf of
the State of Nevada; 16 2 however, some hundreds of registrations were
16 3
made in the names of Nevada State agencies.
U.S. states and foreign countries adopt a variety of approaches to
copyright in state works. The Berne Convention leaves the decision to
the contracting countries-parties to the Convention whether or not
they protect "official texts of legislative, administrative and legal
nature" 16 4 and "political speeches and speeches delivered in the course
of legal proceedings." 16 5 Some countries follow a model for their
government works similar to the model that the United States adopted
for U.S. Government works. For example, the German Copyright Act
excludes from copyright protection "[liaws, regulations, official decrees
and announcements, and also decisions and official version of reasons
of decisions." 16 6 The Act also affords no copyright protection to
"official works that are published in the public interest for general
16 7
information."
Common law countries other than the United States do not seem to
be as generous to the public with governmental works as the United
States is with U.S. Government works. In the United Kingdom, as they
are in other countries of the Commonwealth, government works are
16 9
protected by copyright that vests in the Crown 16 8 or the Parliament,
depending on who created the works. However, this ostensibly
restrictive approach in the United Kingdom is balanced by extensive
exceptions that are included in the U.K. copyright statute and through

161. Nev. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 71-03 (January 11, 1971).
162. E.g., a general highway base map of the State of Nevada, 1984
(VA0000178399 / 1984-08-01).
163. The agencies include the Nevada Department of Highways, the Nevada
Department of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, the Nevada Department of
Transportation, the State Health Division, the Division of Environmental
Protection, and the Nevada System of Higher Education.
164. Berne Convention, supra note 80, Article 1(4).
165. Id.,Article 2bis.
166. Urheberrechtsgesetz, § 5(1), (May 10, 2017) https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/urhg/__5.html [https://perma.cc/Y9BC-UDXK].
167. Id., §5(2).
168. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, % 163 and 164,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/part/I/chapter/X/crossheading/c
rown-and-parliamentary-copyright [https://perma.cc/G4UR-PB2 El.
169. Id.,% 165 and 166.
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use of the Open Government Licence. 170 In Canada, copyright in
government works vests in the Crown as well 17 1 and is also subject to
exceptions, including the exception of fair dealing.17 2 Between 2010
and 2013, the Government of Canada provided a public license for
non-commercial uses; since 201 3 it has required individual copyright
clearances for uses that go beyond the general exceptions listed in the
17 3
Canadian copyright statute.
These foreign examples may be instructive in determining what a
U.S. state might do when it wishes to limit its copyright. One option
would be to attach a public license to state works that would define the
conditions under which users would be permitted to use the works. The
licenses may be tailor made, such as the license in the United Kingdom,
or they may be public licenses, such as the Creative Commons
licenses, 17 4 which have been adopted not only by private persons and
entities, but also by a number of governments. 17 5 For example, one of
the Creative Commons licenses has been used by the White House for
17 6
publication of third-party content on the White House website.
States that wish to retain copyright in state works may also adopt laws
with exceptions that are more generous than the exceptions and
limitations included in the U.S. Copyright Act; such exceptions would
then serve as a royalty-free statutory license to state works.
Both statutory licenses and public licenses have advantages and
disadvantages. The advantage of a statutory license is that it is readily
available in state statutes. A statutory license may apply to all state
works or to a small number of general categories of state works, and a

170. Open
Government
Licence,
THE
NATIONAL
ARCHIVES,
http:/ /www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ doc/open-government-licence/version/ 3/
[https://perma.cc/73CN-HELA].
171. Copyright Act (RS.C., 1985, c. C-42), Art. 12, http://lawslois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-42 /page-4.html#docCont

EMACI.
172. Id.Art.29.
173. Crown
Copyright
Request,
http://canada.pch.gc.ca/eng/1454685607328

[https://perma.cc/D665-

Government
of
Canada,
[https://perma.cc/TDU9-FD4VI.

.See also Michael Geist, Government of Canada Quietly Changes Its Approach to Crown
Copyright (November 25, 2013) http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2013/1 I/crown-

copyright-change/ [https://perma.cc/5 PFX-WE58].
174.

CREATIVE

COMMONS,

(May

10,

2017), https://creativecommons.org

[https://perma.cc/7ZN8-AQ5X].
175.

Government,

CREATIVE

COMMONS,

(May

10,

2017)

https://creativecommons.org/about/program-areas/policy-advocacy-copyrightreform/government/ [https:7/perma.cc/64WB-Y8PF].
176. Copyright Policy, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/copyright
[https://perma.cc/Q7HJ-U2MY]. See also, for example, the WIPO's policy for its
materials
at
Terms
of
Use,
WIPO,
(May
10,
2017),
http://www.wipo.int/tools/en/disclaim.html [https://perma.cc/R655-8VLA].
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straightforward categorization of works can contribute to legal
certainty. Of course, an overly general categorization might not allow
for sufficient granularity. The advantage of a public license is that it
allows for a tailored granularity; each work may be released under a
different license, depending on a state's needs and policies concerning
the particular work. The problem with a public license system is that its
implementation requires a policy that outlines who will decide and how
it will be decided what license attaches to each work. Without such a
policy there can be no legal certainty about the license status of future
works. Such a policy requires attention: it must be created,
implemented, monitored, assessed, and potentially revised.
In addition to the statutory license and public license routes, there
is theoretically yet another manner by which a state can implement a
selective approach to copyright to state works: the state might decide
not to enforce its copyright at all, or to do so only in rare circumstances.
However, such selective non-enforcement is highly problematic; in the
absence of any policy identifying when to enforce and when not,
enforcement actions would be arbitrary, or perceived as being arbitrary.
The major flaw of this approach is that it provides no legal certainty to
users, and consequently anyone who wants to utilize state works might
be deterred from doing so in light of the risk of being sued.
The two Nevada provisions on copyright to state works-NRS
344.070 and NRS 218F.730-should be amended to eliminate
outdated language about "securing copyright"; instead, the provisions
17 7
should reiterate the fact that the state owns copyright to state works,
and mandate that selected state works be registered within a certain
period of time, who should register them, in whose name they should
be registered, and potentially also where registration costs should be
charged. A Colorado statute provides a useful example; it states that the
state owns copyright to the Colorado Revised Statutes and "ancillary
publications thereto."1 7 8 The Colorado statute also provides that a
1 79
committee "may register a copyright for and in behalf of the state."
Registering state works with the U.S. Copyright Office remains
important because of the advantages that the U.S. Copyright Act
maintains for copyright owners who register their copyrights, and
particularly for those who register copyrights within certain periods. 180
These advantages are as important for the State as they are for other
copyright owners; however, it is clearly infeasible for all state works to

177. See, e.g., NRS 396.7972 ("The Board of Regents, on behalf of the Ethics
Institute, may... [rieceive and hold.., patents, copyrights, ... ").
178. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-5-115 (West 2011).
179. Id.

180. See supra note 130.
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be registered, and therefore the statute should keep registration
permissive.
After clarifying the ownership and registration of copyright to state
works, a statute could create a statutory license for such state works.
One option would be to grant a perpetual, non-exclusive, and royaltyfree license to all state works and thus de facto achieve the same result
for state works that federal copyright law achieves for U.S. Government
works. However, this option might not be the best for a state because it
is difficult to predict what kinds of works the state will produce in the
future and how private parties might seek to utilize the works. It might
therefore be useful to stay within what appears to have been the intent
of the current language in Nevada-to allow free use of state works
unless the state wishes otherwise. If a state wants to extend free use of
state works beyond the federal law framework of fair use and other
exceptions and limitations, additional statutory exceptions included in
the Nevada statutes would appear to be the easiest solution; preferably,
such exceptions should apply to all state works, or be divided into a
small number of clearly defined categories of state works.
Instead of or in addition to a statutory license to state works, as
described in the previous paragraph, a state statute could also allow one,
several, or all state agencies to grant public licenses, such as Creative
Commons licenses, for selected state works. If this option is utilized, it
would be advisable to include a provision about the policy that should
guide agencies in decisions about what licenses to grant to each type of
work, and mandate periodic assessments and revisions of the policy. It
would of course be helpful if a single type of public license could be
selected, in order to achieve consistency, contribute to easy education
of the public, establish user expectations, and enhance legal certainty.
Virginia grants public licenses for state works; under its statute, a policy
"authorize[s] state agencies to release all potentially copyrightable
materials under the Creative Commons or Open Source Initiative
18 1
licensing system, as appropriate."
It is important to emphasize that provisions concerning copyright
to state works are not part of the laws on access to public records; the
two matters, although sometimes presented as being in conflict, are in
fact separate and should not be conflated. 18 2 Any amendment to a state

VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2822(B)(1) (2009).
182. See, e.g., Cty. of Suffolk, New York v. First Am. Real Estate Sols.', 261 F.3d
179, 191 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he better reading... is to permit Suffolk County to
maintain its copyright protections while complying with its obligations under [the
New York Freedom of Information Law]."); John A. Kidwell, Open Records Laws and
Copyright, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1021, 1028 (1989) ("Just as open records statutes
should not forfeit copyright, neither should the fact that a work is copyrighted be
allowed to defeat the right to access to the work if it has become a public record.").
181.
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law on copyright to state works must be clearly separated from a state's
public records access laws; insufficient public education about the
differences between copyright to state records and public access to state
records can cause the public to believe that the right to public access to
state records is at risk, as was recently the case with the public's reaction
to a bill introduced in California. 18 3 Copyright in state works must not
be used to diminish public access that is permitted and safeguarded by
public access laws (and by the federal fair use doctrine and other
exceptions and limitations established by federal law), and any bill that
introduces amendments concerning copyright in state works should be
clear about the distinction and interplay between copyright protection
18 4
and public records access rules.
B. Copyright Registration and Trade Secrets
The following example illustrates how a state statute that was
originally adopted to reflect the then-current state of law and practice
has become outdated to the point at which it has become misleading and
potentially harmful-not only to a state's reputation, but also to a state's
innovation policies. The statute is NRS 603.050, which was added to
Nevada's trade secrets provisions in 1983 to define the infringement of
trade secrets of data and computer programs, and also to define when

See also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-203(4) (West 2017):
Nothing in this article [on public records open to inspection] shall preclude the state

or any of its agencies, institutions, or political subdivisions from obtaining and
enforcing trademark or copyright protection for any public record, and the state
and its agencies, institutions, and political subdivisions are hereby specifically

authorized to obtain and enforce such protection in accordance with the applicable
federal law; except that this authorization shall not restrict public access to or fair
use of copyrighted materials and shall not apply to writings which are merely lists
or other compilations.

183. AB 2880 (May 10, 2017), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1516/bill/asm/ab_2851-2900/ab_2880_bill20160315_amended-asm-v98.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GDZ2-CQZL]; Ernesto Falcon, California'sLegislature Wants to
Copyright
All
Government
Works,
EFF
(May
13,
2016),
https:/-/www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/04/ab-2880
[https://perma.cc/X3DSB46U]. The bill was eventually amended under the pressure of critics. See, e.g., Mitch
Stoltz, California Legislature Drops Proposalto Copyright All Government Works, EFF
(June 22, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/06/california-legislature-

drops-proposal-copyright-all-government-works
[https://perma.cc/2QLH7RLT]. Apparently, an impetus for the bill was the dispute concerning protection of
trademarks in Yosemite National Park. See A.B. 2880, California Assembly on
Judiciary, April 19, 2016, pp. 3-4; City of Inglewood v. Teixeira, C.D. Cal., No.

2:15-cv-01815-MWF-MRW, Aug. 20, 2015.
184. In Nevada, see NEV. REV. STAT. 239.010(1) (2017); 1989 Nev. AG LEXIS 1
(1989).
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data or computer programs are a trade secret. 185 Nevada's trade secret
definition for data and computer programs is identical to the standard
definition of trade secrets in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 186 with one
notable exception: the Nevada statute in point 4 excludes data and
programs that were "copyrighted because an application therefor would
87
result in the program or data no longer being secret."I
Considering current federal law, there are three problems with the
fourth condition (point 4) in NRS 603.050. First, as discussed in Section
A above, since March 1, 1989, there has been no act of "copyrighting"
necessary for a work to be protected by copyright. A work, including a
computer program, is protected by copyright as soon as the program is
fixed in a tangible medium of expression and as long as the program is
an original work of authorship. International law mandates both
automatic copyright protection-free of any formalities such as
registration or publication with a notice 188 -and copyright protection
for computer programs. 189 Point 4 of NRS 603.050 suggests, as do the
two statutes discussed in Section A above, a link between copyright
protection and a formality-the act of having a work "copyrighted";
this link no longer exists because formalities-a registration or a
publication with a copyright notice-are no longer required for
copyright protection.
The second problem with the fourth condition of NRS 603.050 is
that a registration of copyright to a computer program does not have to
jeopardize the secrecy of a trade secret in the computer program. The
Copyright Office provides for a specially-designed registration
procedure that respects the secrecy of the program. For computer
programs that contain trade secrets, the Copyright Office requires "a
cover letter stating that the claim contains trade secrets, along with the
page containing the copyright notice, if any," and only a limited portion

185. S.B. 395 Session Law 1983.
186. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 1(4).
187. NEV. REV. STAT. § 603.050 (2017):
It is an infringement of a trade secret for a person, without the consent of the
owner, to obtain possession of or access to a proprietary program or a compilation
of proprietary information that is stored as data in a computer and make or cause
to be made a copy of that program or data if the program or data:
1. Is used in the owner's business;
2. Gives the owner an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it;
3. Is treated by the owner as secret; and
4. Is not copyrighted because an application therefor would result in the
program or data no longer being secret.
188. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
189. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81, art. 10; WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996,
art. 4.
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of the source code, the extent of which the Copyright Office defines. 19 0
The reference in the fourth condition of NRS 603.050 to the
copyright registration process led one set of current-day commentators
to remark that the statute's language "reveals an important
misunderstanding of Copyright Office procedures by the Nevada
Legislature." 19 1 However, the statute did take into consideration the
registration rules that existed in 198 3 when the statute was originally
adopted. It was not until 1989 that the U.S. Copyright Office adopted
the special registration rule for computer programs; 192 before 1989, the
rule called for a deposit of "the first and last 2 5 pages or equivalent units
of the program," 19 3 regardless of whether the pages contained a portion
of the program that might have been a trade secret. Therefore, it is only
in the context of post- 1989 Copyright Office practice that the Nevada
statute appears to be based on a misunderstanding of the practice.
In one of the versions of the draft statute discussed in the legislative
process in 1983, the limitation of the trade secrets definition in the
statute applied to programs or data that were "copyrighted."' 19 4 This
plain wording would have been better from the perspective of current
practice because it stated no conclusion about the effects of an
application for registration that is today incorrect as to computer
programs for which only a portion of the code is submitted to the
Copyright Office under the rule mentioned above. However, the plain
wording, as would have the current wording, would have excluded the
possibility of overlapping protection-protection by both trade secrets
and copyright-for computer programs, which is unnecessarily
limiting because overlapping protection is in fact possible. 19 5

190. 37 C.F.Rt § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A)(2); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR No.
61: COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS, 3 (2012),

http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ61.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ8L-2S261.
191.

McEwan et al., supra note 134, 481-482.

192. Registration of Claims to Copyright Deposit Requirements for Computer
Programs Containing Trade Secrets and for Computer Screen Displays, 54 Fed.
Reg. 13173-01, (March 31, 1989) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 202). Before the special
rule was adopted in 1989, applicants could invoke a special waiver of the deposit
rule and submit a smaller portion of the code. However, the waivers were
infrequently utilized; according to the Copyright Office, as of 1989 "over 90% of
computer program remitters continue[d] to submit the required 50 pages of source
code without portions blocked out." Id.

193. 37 C.F.R § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A) (1988).
194. Amendment No. 883, Nev. Assembly Judiciary Comm., 62d Sess. (Nev.

1983).
195. Although, in general, protection by overlapping IP rights is not without
controversy, there is no law-either domestic or international-that prohibits

overlapping protection by trade secret law and copyright law. For a general
discussion of overlapping IP rights of various types see, e.g., Laura Heymann,
OverlappingIntellectualPropertyDoctrines:Election of Rights Versus Selection of Remedies,
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The third problem of point 4 concerns its reference to data. Data are
not protectable by copyright unless the data consist of works
protectable by copyright, such as photographs. Typically, though, data
do not consist of copyright-protectable works but rather of pieces of
information-facts that do not, on their own, enjoy copyright
protection. 196 Compilations of data might be protected by copyright,
but only as to a compilation's original selection, coordination, and/or
arrangement. 197 When a registration of a compilation is made, the
deposit is not required to include data-particularly if the data are
protected as trade secrets or protected by other laws, such as the HIPAA
privacy law 19 8 -but it must include the structure of the compilation
that indicates the selection of data, and/or their coordination, and/or
their arrangement. Therefore, even when an application for copyright
registration is made-and an application is certainly not necessary for
copyright protection, as explained earlier-the data protected as trade
secrets do not have to be included in the application and thus do not
have to lose their protection as trade secrets.
When the statute was originally adopted in 1983, point 4 seemed
reasonable. At that time, copyright protection attached to a work only
on the registration of the work or a publication with a copyright notice.
In the absence of a special procedure for registering computer programs
that were subject to trade secrets, an act of "copyrighting" would have
resulted in the disclosure of the program, which would have led to the
loss of the status of the program as a trade secret. Also, it was not until
1991 that the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the rules for copyright in
compilations of data. 199 However, with the changes that have occurred
in federal copyright law since 19 8 3, point 4 no longer makes sense.
Currently, there is no provision comparable to point 4 in the
20 0
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which does not refer to copyright at all,
and there seems to be no corresponding provision in the statutes of
other states. 20 1 Courts have not considered copyright registration to

17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 239 (2013); Doris Estelle Long, First, "Let's Kill All the
IntellectualPropertyLawyers!": Musings on the Decline and Fall of the IntellectualProperty
Empire, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 851 (2001); J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the
Patent and Copyright Paradigms,94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432 (1994).
196. 17 U.S.C. §102(b) (2015); Berne Convention, supra note 80, art. 2(8); Feist
Publ'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
197. Feist Publ'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR No. 14: COPYRIGHT IN DERIVATIVE WORKS AND

COMPILATIONS
(2013),
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ 1 4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8NEQ-36C2].
198. 45C.F.R1pts. 160, 162, 164 (2017).
199. See supra note 197.
200. UNIF. TRADE SECRETSACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005).
201. No corresponding provision exists in U.S. federal trade secret legislation.
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necessarily preempt trade secret protection as long as a work was not
fully deposited with the Copyright Office. 20 2 While interpreting Idaho's
Trade Secrets Act,20 3 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
stated that "disclosure of a portion of the source code to the Copyright
Office, in itself, is not necessarily inconsistent with maintaining the
secrecy and value of the trade secret.12 0 4 The Nevada statute could be
viewed as being in violation of international law because it imposes a
limitation that is contrary to Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement, which
requires that countries afford protection to trade secrets defined in the
standard manner, with no limitation that is based on copyright
2 05
protection.
The most straightforward legislative remedy of the problems
outlined above would be to delete point 4 in NRS 603.050, or delete the
definition in NRS 603.050 altogether and refer to the general statute
on trade secrets in NRS 600A.030. In the second case, an amendment
to the provision could be considered in the framework of systemic
revisions of the entire state secrets law 20 6 and the NRS chapter on
208
computers 2 07 -a project that is beyond the scope of this article.
In the absence of a legislative intervention (i.e. the provision is left
as it is), the problems with NRS 603.050 could be remedied through
court interpretation. A court could conclude that if the status of a trade
secret has not been compromised in the application process, the
program remains protected as a trade secret. Litigants could also rely on
the general trade secrets statute in NRS 600A.030 for a claim of trade
secrets misappropriation instead of NRS 603.050; NRS 600A.030
refers to "computer programming instruction or code" 20 9 in the

202. E.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 923
F.Supp. 1231, 1255 n.28 (N.D.Cal. 1995) ("There is no merit to [the alleged
infringer's] claim that the registration of the ... works with the Copyright Office

forfeited their trade secret status, as it appears that these works were registered in
masked form." Id.); Compuware Corp. v. Serena Software Int'l, Inc., 77 F.Supp.2d
816 (E.D. Mich. 1999).

203. IDAHOCODEANN. §48-801 (West 2017).
204. JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1129-1130 (9th Cir. 2013).
205. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81, arti 39(2).
206. NEV. REV. STAT. § 600A, Trade Secrets (Uniform Act) (2017).
207. Id. § 603, Computers.
208. See supra Introduction for an explanation of the limitation of the scope of
this article.
209. NEV. REV. STAT. § 600A.030(5) (2017):
5. 'Trade secret' means information, including, without limitation, a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, product, system, process,
design, prototype, procedure, computer programming instruction or code that:
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by the
public or any other persons who can obtain commercial or economic value from its

100
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definition of "trade secret" and does not include the same limitation that
NRS 603.050 does in point 4.210
It does not seem advisable, however, to leave NRS 603.050 as it is.
The statute may mislead those who are unfamiliar with IP law, and in
several ways. A less-informed reader might conclude that data are
protectable by copyright, that an application for registration is
necessary to obtain copyright protection, and/or that in cases of data
and computer programs a choice must be made between copyright
protection and trade secrets protection, with one excluding the other.
These conclusions are all incorrect and state law should not create an
impression to the contrary.
C. The Unlawful Reproduction or Sale of Sound Recordings
Keeping state copyright statutes current is difficult, particularly
since state legislatures have many competing priorities. Not only might
state legislatures be slow to reflect in their state laws all of the changes
that copyright law and practice have undergone in recent decades, but
legislative tasks are also complicated by the various complex
overlapping of outdated state laws with current federal legislation;
overlaps cause some state statutes to be preempted. Sifting through state
statutes in search of non-preempted provisions and attempting to
discern original legislative intent might present the difficult challenges
that this next example illustrates.
Nevada statute NRS 205.217 makes certain acts of "unlawful
reproduction or sale of sound recordings" category C or D felonies. The
statute falls within the general category of "piracy statutes" for sound
recordings-statutes that exist in almost all states in some form 21 1

disclosure or use; and
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
210. Id.

211. For a collection of state "piracy statutes" concerning sound recordings see
State
Law
Texts,
U.S.
Copyright
Office
(2011)
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/20110705-state-law-texts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JK8E-WFQZ]. By 1975, "32 states prohibit[ed] record piracy by
statute, and four more [did] so under common law." Report from the Committee on
the Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 116 (1975) See also
Statement by Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights, in Copyright Law Revision:
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice onH.R. 2223 Copyright Law Revision, Part 1, 94th Cong., 1stSess. (1975), 115
("In the early 1970s there was an increase in record piracy because of the increasing
popularity of 8-track cartridges. As a result, there was a major effort to get States to
pass legislation or to enforce common law protection" of sound recordings.).
Protection against the unauthorized reproduction of sound recordings was
mandated by the Geneva Phonograms Convention, which came into force for the
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and although NRS 205.217 is not phrased as a copyright statute, its
content clearly intersects with copyright law because the statute
concerns tangible media of expression in which works subject to
copyright protection may be fixed. The media that the statute concerns
are "a phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, film or other article on which
sounds are recorded" 2 12 (for simplification, the rest of this section refers
to all of these media as "sound carriers"). The problem with the statute
2 13
is that it is at least partially preempted by federal copyright law.
The statute, originally enacted in 19 7 3,214 defines criminal offenses
in paragraphs (1) and (2). Paragraph (1) has two subparagraphs: 2 15
Subparagraph (a) makes it a felony to knowingly "[t]ransfer or cause to
be transferred any sounds recorded" on one sound carrier onto another
sound carrier. 2 16 Subparagraph (b) concerns acts of knowingly and
"without the consent of the person who owns [... a] device or article
from which the sounds are derived," such as a master disc (further
referred to in this section as a "master recording"), selling, distributing,
and circulating a sound carrier, and offering a sound carrier for sale,
distribution, or circulation. The statute makes it a felony to commit
these acts, or possess a sound carrier for the purposes of committing

United States on March 10, 1974. Geneva Phonograms Convention, supra note 94.
212. NEV. REV. STAT. §205.217(1)(a) (2017).
213. On the preemption of a state criminal statute by the U.S. Copyright Act see
State v. Oidor, 292 P.3d 629, 633 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) ("Applying the preemptive
effect of section 301 to state civil but not criminal law could lead to the development
of 'vague borderline areas' between federal and state protection of copyrights." Id.);
People v. Williams, 920 N.E.2d 446, 454, 457 (1Il.2009) ("[I]t would border on the
absurd to hold that Congress preempted states from making unauthorized use of
copyrighted material a civil wrong, but permitted the states to make the same
conduct a crime." Id., 457.).
214. Nev. Assemb. B. 406, 57th Sess. (1973). Amendments in 1979 and 1995
did not substantially change paragraphs 1-3, which are discussed in this Section. See
S.B. 9, Comm. onJudiciary, 60th Sess. (Nev. 1979); S.B. 416 Comm. on judiciary,
68th Sess. (Nev. 1995).
215. NEv.REV.STAT.§205.217(1)(2017):

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, it is unlawful for any person,
firm, partnership, corporation or association knowingly to:
(a) Transfer or cause to be transferred any sounds recorded on a phonograph
record, disc, wire, tape, film or other article on which sounds are recorded onto any
other phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, film or article; or
(b) Sell, distribute, circulate, offer for sale, distribution or circulation, possess
for the purpose of sale, distribution or circulation, or cause to be sold, distributed,
circulated, offered for sale, distribution or circulation, or possessed for sale,
distribution or circulation, any article or device on which sounds have been
transferred without the consent of the person who owns the master phonograph
record, master disc, master tape or other device or article from which the sounds
are derived.
216. NEV. REV. STAT. §205.217(1)(a) (2017).
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these acts, or cause such acts to be committed. 2 17 Paragraph (2)
concerns the labeling of sound carriers; 2 18 it makes it a felony "to sell,
distribute, circulate, offer for sale, distribution or circulation[,1 or
possess for the purposes of sale, distribution or circulation" a copy of a
sound carrier "unless the [sound carrier] bears the actual name and
address of the transferor of the sounds in a prominent place on its
2 19
outside face or package.1
Paragraph (3) of NRS 205.217220 includes a version of a fair use
provision for the purposes of the statute. It exempts from the
application of the statute "any person who transfers or causes to be
transferred any sounds intended for or in connection with radio or
television broadcast transmission or related uses, for archival purposes
or solely for the personal use of the person transferring or causing the
transfer and without any compensation being derived by the person
from the transfer."2 2 1 The exemption is for the "person who transfers
or causes to be transferred" and does not extend to other persons who
commit the acts in (1)(b) and (2) but are not themselves the persons
"transferring or causing to be transferred."
The provisions in paragraph (1) are largely preempted by federal
copyright law. 22 2 The complexity of the overlap is illustrated by Tables

217.
218.

NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.217(1)(b) (2017).
NEV.REV.STAT. § 205.217(2) (2017):

2. It is unlawful for any person, firm, partnership, corporation or association to
sell, distribute, circulate, offer for sale, distribution or circulation or possess for the
purposes of sale, distribution or circulation, any phonograph record, disc, wire, tape,
film or other article on which sounds have been transferred unless the phonograph
record, disc, wire, tape, film or other article bears the actual name and address of
the transferor of the sounds in a prominent place on its outside face or package.
219. NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.217(2) (2017). The provision may bring to mind the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dastarwhere the Court refused to apply section
43(a) of the Lanham Act in a case involving the labeling of a DVD including a
television series; the Court declined to use section 43(a) in a manner that would de
facto create a right of attribution in this type of work, and ruled that the defendant
could distribute the edited version of the series under its own name, without
mentioning the plaintiff's name. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003).
220. NEV.REV.STAT. § 205.217(3) (2017):
3. This section does not apply to any person who transfers or causes to be
transferred any sounds intended for or in connection with radio or television
broadcast transmission or related uses, for archival purposes or solely for the
personal use of the person transferring or causing the transfer and without any
compensation being derived by the person from the transfer.
221. Id.
222. In addition to its other provisions that may preempt state statutes (see supra
note 213), the Copyright Act includes criminal law provisions that may preempt
state law. Section 506(a) makes it a criminal offense to infringe copyright if the
infringement was committed "for purposes of commercial advantage or private
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1 and 2 below. Both tables list the types of works that are protected by
NRS 205.217. "[Any sounds recorded" under the statute imply sound
recordings in the U.S. Copyright Act's terminology; 2 2 3 however,
because the Nevada statute covers sounds embodied not only on
phonographs and tapes but also on film, the statute also concerns
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, which federal copyright
law protects "together with accompanying sounds.12 24 In addition to
the sounds potentially protected either as sound recordings or as
components of audiovisual works or motion pictures, the statute also
protects works that are fixed through the recording of the sounds-the
underlying works that may also be protected by federal copyright. 225
22 6
These might be literary works (e.g., a book recorded as an audiobook)
or musical works (e.g., a composition with the accompanying words
2 27
recorded in an MP3 file).
Not all sound carriers covered by NRS 205.217 will include works
that are protected by federal copyright. Sound recordings fixed before
February 1 5, 1972, are explicitly outside the scope of federal copyright
protection. 2 28 Sound recordings fixed on or after February 1 5, 1972,
audiovisual works, and motion pictures are protected by federal
copyright if they are original works of authorship 2 29 and their term of
protection has not expired. 2 30 Additionally, works published before
March 1, 1989 (with the exception of pre-February 15, 1972, sound
recordings), are protected only if the necessary formalities were
23 1
complied with.

financial gain," or by the reproduction and distribution of a phonorecord of a
copyrighted work within a period of time and with a specified minimum total retail
value, or by distribution to the public on a computer network of a work being
prepared for commercial distribution, if "such person knew or should have known

that the work was intended for commercial distribution." 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)
(2015). Further criminal provisions in the U.S. Copyright Act concern fraudulent
copyright notices, fraudulent removal of a copyright notices, and a false
representation in an application for copyright registration. Id. § 506(c)-(e).
223.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015) ("Sound recordings") and §102(7) (2015).

224. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015) ("Audiovisual works" and "Motion pictures") and
102(6) (2015).
225. On the history of the protection of musical works in various types of
copies, see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 565-566 (1973).
226. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015) ("Literary works) and § 102(1) (2015).
227. 17 U.S.C. § 102(2) (2015).
228. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2015). See also supra Part 1,Section A.
229. 17 U.S.C.§ 102 (2015).
230. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2015). See also Maljack Prods., Inc. v. Goodtimes
Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding i.a. that a California
statute's "protection of 'sound recording[s]' does not apply to motion picture
soundtracks").
231. See supra Part 1I, Section A on the formalities required for copyright
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The underlying works (i.e. literary or musical works) are also
protected by federal copyright if they are original works of authorship,
their term of protection has not expired, and if they were published
before March 1, 1989, the formalities necessary for their protection
were met. 2 3 2 Whether or not the underlying works are protected by
copyright does not affect the copyrightability of the sound recordings,
audiovisual works, and motion pictures. For example, a 2006 recording
of a concerto that J.S. Bach composed in 1721 is protected by federal
copyright as a sound recording, even though the underlying
composition (musical work) is not protected by copyright. And,
conversely, it is possible for a sound recording not to be protected while
the underlying work is protected. For example, a 1967 Beatles sound
recording of John Lennon's "All You Need Is Love" is not protected by
federal copyright law (because it is a pre-1972 sound recording);
however, the underlying work-the 1967 composition of the song with
the accompanying words-is protected as a musical work.
It is possible for sounds that are recorded on a sound carrier to
include works not protectable by federal copyright law. For example, a
recording of bird songs, without any alteration or modification of the
sounds, will have no underlying work that is protectable by federal
copyright law because the songs are not works of authorship. 2 3 3 As for
the sound recording itself, it also must be an original work of
authorship, and it could be outside the protection of federal copyright
law if it lacks the minimum degree of creativity required for federal
23 4
copyright protection.
NRS 205.217 covers all sounds and all underlying works recorded
on a sound carrier, whether or not they are protected by federal
copyright law. This is problematic in view of the preemption doctrine,
particularly considering that preemption concerns not only works
actually protected by federal copyright but also works that are
purposefully excluded from federal protection, such as works whose
35
copyright term has expired. 2
Table 1 summarizes the application of the preemption doctrine to
works and acts covered by NRS 205.217(1)(a). The provision covers

protection before March 1, 1989. In cases of foreign works, even if the formalities
were not complied with, copyright might subsist if it was restored under 17 U.S.C.
104A (2015).
232. Id.
233. On the requirement of human authorship, see Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (commenting on "copyright, as the exclusive
right of a man to the production of his own genius or intellect").
234. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991)
(discussing originality as "aconstitutional requirement").
235. See supra Part I, SectionA.

Fall 2017

U.S. STATE COPYRIGHT LAWS

acts of transferring and causing to be transferred-acts that correspond
to the act of reproduction and the act of authorizing a reproduction
under the U.S. Copyright Act. 23 6 There is no "extra element" that is
required for a violation of NRS 205.217(1)(a)-an "extra element" that
would keep the acts outside of preemption. 23 7 The NRS provision is
therefore preempted whenever protected works, or unprotected works
within the protectable subject matter, are concerned. The preemption
conclusion does not change because of the fact that the "fair uses" listed
in NRS 205.217(3) do not coincide with the uses permissible under the
federal copyright law's fair use doctrine and other exceptions and
limitations under the Copyright Act. State law cannot expand what
would de facto be copyright protection beyond the limits set by federal
238
copyright law.
NRS 205.217(1)(a) is not preempted to the extent that it applies to
pre- 1 972 sound recordings and it is also not preempted as it applies to
2 39
subject matter unprotectable under the U.S. Copyright Act.
TABLE

Acts criminalized
by NRS
205.217(1)(a)

"Transfer or cause
to be transferred"

1: NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.217(1 )(A) AND PREEMPTION BY FEDERAL
24
COPYRIGHT LAW

0

Works protected by NRS 205.217(1)(a)
Subject matter within the scope of the
U.S. Other subject matter
Copyright Act (sound recordings, audiovisual intentionally
left
works, motion pictures, literary works, and musical outside the scope of the
works)
U.S. Copyright Act
Works not protected by federal ©
Works
Expressly exempted Other
protected
from preemption
unprotected
by federal ©
(pre-1972
sound works
recordings)
NP
P
P
NP

236. 17U.S.C.§106(1)(2015).
237. For the requirement of an "extra element" see supra Part I, Section A.
238. See supra Part I, SectionA.
239. It is difficult to envision a kind of subject matter embodied in a sound
carrier that would be outside the scope of preemption. Even a bird song (mentioned
earlier) could be understood to be a musical work without the proper human
authorship, and thus be a work purposefully excluded from the scope of federal
copyright law. The application of the Nevada statute to the same bird song would
then also be preempted.
240. In the table, "NP" stands for "not preempted," P" stands for "preempted."
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As opposed to paragraph (1)(b), paragraph l(a) does not exempt
from criminal offenses acts that occur with the consent of the owner of
the master recording. The preemption doctrine should protect many
persons and entities that have permission or a license to reproduce
copyright-protected works from existing to new sound carriers;
additional acts will be covered by the fair use provision in paragraph (3).
The problem arises for those who reproduce sound carriers with pre1972 sound recordings and/or other works that fall outside the scope
of the subject matter protectable under federal law. NRS 205.217(1)(a)
continues to criminalize reproductions of sound carriers with such
works if done knowingly and for commercial advantage and private
financial gain, even if the reproducer has the consent of the owner of
the master recording.
It is possible that the last portion of paragraph (1)(b) was intended
to apply to paragraph (1)(a) as well, meaning that both (1)(a) and (1)(b)
were supposed to concern only transfers of sounds done without the
consent of the owner of the master recording. But even this limitation
might not change the outcome of the preemption analysis in cases of
works protected by federal copyright law. Although the consent of the
owner of the master recording might seem to be an "extra element"
needed to defeat preemption, it would be an extra element only if the
owner of the master and the potential owner of the copyright are two
different persons or entities. 24 1 If the two owners are one and the same
(which might be the case in practice because a music label is often the
owner of both the master recording and the copyright in the sound
recording, and sometimes even the underlying work), there will be no
extra element. Furthermore, the provision would create a de facto
perpetual right of reproduction, which would be in conflict with federal
copyright law and the IP Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 242
Preemption might be found even in situations in which the owner
of the master recording is not the same person or entity as the owner of
the copyright to the sound recording. The Supreme Court of Illinois
concluded in People v. Williams 24 3-a case that concerned a statute in
Illinois 24 4 that is similar to the statute in Nevada-that "the fact that the

241. See infra note 257 and the accompanying text for the reason that the statute
uses the term "owner of the master" as opposed to "copyright owner."
242. 17 U.S.C. §301(c) (2015); State v. Oidor, 292 P.3d 629,633 (Or. Ct. App.
2012). See also Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223, Part 3 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civ. Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1911 (1975) (statement of Barbara Ringer, Register of
Copyrights) (proposing limits on state law protection of pre-1972 sound
recordings-at that time to February 15, 2047).
243. 920 N.E.2d 446 (Il.
2009).
244. 720 ILCS 5/16-7.
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owner of the copyright might not be the actual owner of the master
recording does not create an 'extra element' making [the state statute]
qualitatively different from copyright infringement." 245 The Court
opined that "[t]he fact that an 'owner' of the master recording may not
be a copyright holder does not take the [state] statute out of the realm
covered by the federal Act, where the statute in question is substantially
2 46
a copyright infringement statute."
Table 2 below, which traces the federal preemption of NRS
205.217(1)(b), treats the question of the "extra element," which would
have consisted of the consent of the owner of the master recording, as
resolved by the above analysis by the Supreme Court of Illinois. As a
result, whether the owner of the master recording is or is not the owner
of the copyright has no bearing on the outcome of the preemption
analysis.
Another question arises as to the acts in paragraph (1)(b) that have
no corresponding acts in the U.S. Copyright Act, specifically the acts of
possession of the sound carriers with the transferred sounds. While it
could be argued that the provision de facto creates new rights above the
federal copyright law framework (and therefore federal law should not
preempt the provision), 2 47 it could also be argued that the provision de
facto negates a carve-out that is created by the federal doctrine of fair
use, and therefore federal law should preempt the provision.248
In 2012, the Court of Appeals of Oregon considered whether the
acts of advertising and offering for sale were equivalent to the rights
provided by the U.S. Copyright Act. The acts were covered by ORS
§ 164.86 5(1)(b), which made it a criminal offense to "[k]nowingly sell[],
offer[] for sale or advertise[] for sale any sound recording that has been
reproduced without the written consent of the owner of the master
recording.1 2 4 9 The court concluded that the Oregon statute did afford
protections equivalent to the federal copyright law's right of
distribution 25 0 and impermissibly "provide[d] the owner with perpetual
protection that [was] not limited by copyright principles such as fair
use.1 25 1 The statute's inclusion of acts of advertising and offering for
sale "enhance[d] or supplement[ed] the protection afforded to copyright

245. People v. Williams, 920 N.E.2d at 459.
246. Id.

247. See supra Part I, SectionA.
248. See supra note 47 and the accompanying text.
249. O.R.S. § 164.865(1)(b). In response to a petition for reconsideration the

Court clarified its decision by stating that the decision did not consider preemption
of the provision with respect to its application to pre- 1972 sound recordings. State
v. Oidor, 258 Or.App. 459, 460; 310 P.3d 671, 671 (Or. Ct. App. 2013).
250. State v. Oidor, 292 P.3d 629, 634 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
251. Id. at 633.
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owners by the federal act by prohibiting acts that can lead to
25 2
unauthorized distribution by sale of copyrighted sound recordings."
TABLE 2: NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.217(1)(B)AND PREEMPTION BY FEDERAL
25
COPYRIGHT LAW

Acts criminalized
by NRS
205.217(1)(b)
"without the
consent of the
person who owns
the master"
recording

"Sell, distribute,
circulate"
"Offer for sale,
distribution or
circulation"
"Possess for the
purpose of sale,
distribution or
circulation"
"Cause to be sold,
distributed,
circulated, offered
for sale,
distribution or
circulation"
"Cause to be ...
possessed
for sale,
distribution or
circulation"

3

Works protected by NRS 205.217(1)(b)
Subject matter within the scope of the U.S. Copyright Act (sound
recordings, audiovisual works, motion pictures, literary works,
and musical works)
Works not protected by federal ©
Works protected by
federal @
©owned
© not
Expressly
Other unprotected
exempted
works
by the
owned by
from
owner
of
the owner
© owned
© not
preemption
the
master
of the
by the
owned by
(pre- 1972
master
owner of
the owner
sound
the master of the
recordings)
master
NP
P
P
P
P

252.
Misc.2d
also not
253.

Other subject
matter
intentionally
left outside
the scope of
the U.S.
Copyright
Act

NP

NP

P

P

P

P

NP

NP

P

P

P

P

NP

NP

P

P

P

P

NP

NP

P

P

P

P

NP

Id. at 634. On advertising in this context see also People v. Borriello, 155
261, 266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) ("The element of 'advertisement' for sale is
an 'extra element' that would qualitatively change the statute.").
In the table, "NP" stands for "not preempted," P"stands for "preempted."
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It is not surprising that a number of states have amended their
criminal provisions on sound recordings to make the provisions apply
only to pre- 1972 recordings, 25 4 given that some state courts have held
that provisions similar to NRS 205.217(1) were preempted with the
exception of their application to pre- 1972 recordings, 25 5 and given that
the U.S. Supreme Court held the California criminal provisions not
preempted as to pre- 1 972 recordings. For instance, the application of
the California statute that was at issue in Goldstein v. California is now
limited to "those articles that were initially mastered prior to February
15, 1972."256 For pre-1972 sound recordings, state statutes often
provide rights to the owner of the master recording, as opposed to the
owner of copyright; because pre-1972 sound recordings enjoy no
protection under federal copyright law, there is no "owner" of copyright
to the sound recordings within the definition in the U.S. Copyright Act.
State legislatures typically do not provide an autonomous definition of
a rights owner for the purposes of the piracy statutes concerning pre1972 sound recordings, which is why state statutes often afford rights
25 7
to the owner of the master recording.
Given the problems created by state statutes similar to NRS
205.217(1), it would be appropriate to amend the Nevada statute to
avoid preemption. The application of the statute should be limited to
pre- 1972 recordings, and the language of the statute should be clarified
to add the consent of the owner of the master to 205.217(1)(a) and
simplify the list of acts in 205.217(1)(b).258 One aspect worth

254. ALA. CODE § 13A-8-81(d) (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3705(C)
(2017); CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h(i) (2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-601(1.5)
(2017); D.C. CODE § 22-3214(e) (2017); FLA. STAT. § 540.11(2)(a)(4) (2017); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-5806(c)(3) (West 2017); MD. CODEANN., CRIm. LAW § 7-308(b)(1)
(2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 752.1052(b)(i); Mo. REV. STAT. § 570.225 (2017);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 352-A:2(III)(a) (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-21(c)(1)
(2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 275.25 (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-433(b) (2017);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1976(A) (2017); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §4116(c)(2) (2017);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-139(b)(2) (2017); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 641.051(a) (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-10-7 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.25.020(4) (2017); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-50(a) (2017); WIS. STAT.
§ 943.207(1)(a) (2017).
255. See supra notes 243, 249.
256. CAL. PENALCODE § 653h(i) (2017).
257. On the difficulties of defining "copyright owner" in state law, given the
absence in the U.S. CopyrightAct of a definition of "copyright owner" in pre-1972
sound recordings, see Gary Pulsinelli, Happy Together? The Uneasy Coexistence of
Federaland State Protectionfor Sound Recordings, 82 TENN. L. REV. 167, 199 (2014).
258. The owner of the master could be replaced with an owner of the copyright
to the pre-1972 recording that the statute could define by reference to federal
copyright rules, or autonomously. However, interest in the protection of legal
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considering could be a disclaimer of the right of public performance in
pre- 1972 sound recordings-a matter discussed in detail in Part III,
Section A below.
As is the case with the statutes in the previous sections of this article,
a state statute could also be amended in a systemic revision of all state
provisions concerning sound and image recordings; some current
developments, discussed in Part III, Section A below, could also affect
25 9
whether and how the statute might be amended.
It could be debated how Nevada's interest in providing an
environment suitable for innovation and creation should be reflected in
the statute that concerns existing works, such as pre-1972 sound
recordings. Typically, arguments for increased protection for existing
works claim that it is necessary to signal to current and future creators
that the law will take care of their future works if the law changes to
enhance protection. This is the reason for which, for example,
extensions of copyright term were legislated to cover works already in
2 60
existence at the time the extensions took effect.
The protection of sound recordings under Nevada law benefits
rights owners regardless of where they are located, but the law covers
only infringing acts that occur in the State. 2 6 1 A state law that provides
strong protection for pre- 1972 sound recordings will therefore not
influence out-of-state rights owners' decisions as to whether or not to
relocate to Nevada, because wherever they are located, they will benefit
from the law in Nevada. A weak provision-or no provision-covering
pre- 1972 sound recordings 26 2 would harm all rights owners, including
those who are domiciled in Nevada, but could theoretically propel some
form of innovation and creativity in Nevada that might rely on pre1972 sound recordings. It is questionable to what extent a weak or nonexistent protection for pre-1972 sound recordings would benefit
Nevada innovators and creators who would like to use pre-1972
recordings; it would be short-sighted for a business to rely on such a law
if the business had aspirations to expand nationally or globally,
including conducting business on the internet, because of the
protections that the recordings might enjoy in some other states and
countries.

certainty weighs in favor of maintaining the owner of the master.
259. See infra Part III, SectionA.
260. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003); Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S.
302, 327 (2012).

261. See supra Part I, Section B for a discussion of the dormant Commerce
Clause.
262. There is nothing in international treaties that mandates protection for pre1972 sound recordings in the United States. See Geneva Phonograms Convention,
supra note 79, Article 7(3).
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Currently, NRS 205.217(1) is not obsolete; the statistics provided
by the Office of the District Attorney for Clark County, Nevada, which
includes, i.a., the large cities of Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, and
Henderson (where about 73% of Nevada residents reside), 26 3 indicate
that in 2012 - 2015 charges were brought in a number of cases under
N.R.S. 205.217(1). Table 3 summarizes the statistics.
TABLE 3: STATISTICS OF CASES UNDER N.R.S. 205.217(1), OFFICE OF THE
DISTRICTATTORNEY FOR CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, 2012 - 2015264

Attempt to
reproduce or sell
sound recordings,
first offense
(category E felony)
2012

Charged
Pleaded
guilty
Found

3

Charged
Pleaded
guilty
Found
guilty
Charged
Pleaded
guilty
Found
guilty
Charged
Pleaded
guilty
Found
guilty

36
2

2014

2015

Reproduction or sale
of sound recordings,
second or
subsequent offense
(category C felony)

Conspiracy to
reproduce or sell
sound recordings
(gross
misdemeanor)

2

guilty

2013

Reproduction or
sale of sound
recordings, first
offense (category
D felony)

1

13
1
1

1

24
10

6

2

2

10

4

263. Clark County, Nevada, Quick Facts, Census (May 10, 2017),
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/32003
[https://perma.cc/LKE7-HZAU] (populations estimatesJuly 1, 2015); Nev., Quick
Facts,
Census
(May
10,
2017)
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/32
[https://perma.cc/2YE8-6G5W] (population estimatesJuly 1, 2015).
264. E-mail from the Clark County District Attorney's Office to author (Aug.
22, 2016, 14:26 PDT) (on file with author).
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IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE LAWS CONCERNING COPYRIGHT
Parts I and II demonstrate that state copyright law is neither limited
to obscure and inconsequential provisions, nor is dead letter. Some of
the most remarkable developments in copyright law today concern state
law in some fashion. The following sections discuss developments that
concern rights to pre-1972 sound recordings, unfair competition
claims regarding so-called "foreign IP theft," and rights to unfixed
works, including performances. The developments should inform state
legislators' thinking about revisions to state IP statutes, and may
possibly result in the eventual adoption of new federal statutes that
could affect some state legislative efforts. However, as pointed out
below, possible federal legislation will leave some space for state
copyright statutes, and other areas are still free for state legislation.
A. Rights in Pre-1972Recordings
Perhaps no area of state IP law has received more attention recently
than state laws on pre-1972 sound recordings. The U.S. Copyright Act
expressly leaves these works outside of preemption. 26 5 This state of
affairs in federal law has been reevaluated by the U.S. Copyright Office,
which in its 2011 report on the topic recommended that federal
copyright protection be extended to cover pre- 1972 sound recordings.
The Office proposed that federal law include "special provisions to
address ownership issues, term of protection, transition period, and
registration" of pre-1972 sound recordings.266 However, such
comprehensive inclusion of pre-1972 recordings in the U.S. Copyright
Act has not yet materialized.
Instead of the comprehensive solution recommended by the U.S.
Copyright Office, a partial coverage of pre- 1 972 sound recordings has
been promoted by "Project72,1 2 67 a campaign launched in 2014 by

265. See supra Part I, Section A. As for the state "piracy statutes" discussed supra
in Part 1I, Section C, the Report from the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
concluded in 1975 that "It]here [was] no justification for exposing pre-1972
recordings to expropriation by record pirates." S. Rep. No. 94-473 at 116 (1975).
266. U.S. Copyright Office, Federal Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound
Recordings: A Report of the Register of Copyrights, Dec. 2011, at 175,
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S8N9-7NHC].
267. PROJECT72
(May
10,
2017),
http://www.project-72.org/
[https://perma.cc/597F-GBYS]. See also SoundExchange, Protecting Pre-72 Sound
Recordings, available at http://www.soundexchange.com/advocacy/pre-1972-
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SoundExchange, an additional, recently established U.S. performing
rights organization. The partial coverage was proposed in a bill called
the RESPECT Act; the title of the bill, which was introduced in
Congress in May 2014,268 stood for "Respecting Senior Performers as
Essential Cultural Treasures Act."12 6 9 The RESPECT Act was not
adopted by the 11 3th Congress and was not reintroduced in the
subsequent Congress; rather, a new bill was introduced in April 201 5
for the Fair Play Fair Pay Act 27 0 (it was reintroduced in the 11 5th
Congress in March 2017).271 This second and substantially more
detailed bill aims to equalize digital and analog audio transmissions by
making the right to perform publicly apply not only to digital
transmissions (as is now the case under the U.S. Copyright Act) but to
all audio transmissions. 2 7 2 Changes to several provisions of the
Copyright Act would reflect the change to the scope of the right to
perform through audio transmission. 2 7 3 As it applies to pre- 1 972 sound
recordings, the bill incorporates the text of the RESPECT Act, in a
27 4
section entitled "Equitable Treatment of Legacy Sound Recordings.1
The RESPECTAct included provisions concerning pre-1972 sound
recordings to address uses by entities that digitally transmit sound
recordings, including both non-subscription-based and subscriptionbased services, such as Pandora, and satellite digital audio radio services,
such as Sirius XM Radio. These entities are already paying statutory
royalties for performing sound recordings "publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission," 2 7 5 but, to date, the royalties are for only the
sound recordings fixed on or after February 1 5, 1972-although some
states have tried to enforce the collection of royalties for pre-1972
sound recordings protected by state law. 27 6 The RESPECT Act would
require the entities to pay statutory royalties also for digitally
transmitting pre- 1 972 sound recordings and for ephemeral copies of
these recordings, 2 77 and the Fair Play Fair Pay Act would expand the

copyright/ [https://perma.cc/QJH7-5SA6].
268.

RESPECTAct, H.R 4772, 113th Cong. §2 (2014) (hereinafter "RESPECT

Act").
269. Id., Section 1.
270. Fair Play Fair PayAct of 2015, H.R 1733, 114th Cong. § 1(2015).
271. Fair Play Fair Pay Act of 2017, H.R. 1836, 115th Cong. (2017).
272. Id., Section 2, amending 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2015). This was not the first
time that Congress had considered a more robust performance right to sound
recordings. See S. Rep. No. 91-1219 at 7 (1970).
273. Fair Play Fair Pay Act of 2017, supra note 271, Section 2.
274. Id., Section 7.
275. 17 U.S.C. % 106(6) (2015), 114(f) (2015).
276. See supra Part I, Section B.
277. 17 U.S.C. §112(e); RESPECT Act, Section 2, adding 17 U.S.C.
1 4(f)(4)(D)(i).
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coverage to entities engaged in all types of audio transmissions. 27 8
Neither
bill
addresses
pre- 1972
sound
recordings
comprehensively, as the U.S. Copyright Office proposed to do in its
2011 report; 27 9 the bills leave unaddressed for pre-1972 sound
recordings issues of ownership, term of protection, and registration.
Although the Fair Play Fair Pay Act would create an obligation to "make
royalty payments.., in the same manner as such person does for sound
recordings that are protected under [the U.S. Copyright Act],1 280 this
language is not designed to resolve the outstanding issues.
Because it would not address pre-1972 sound recordings
comprehensively, the Fair Play Fair Pay Act would not completely
preempt state laws onpre-1972 sound recordings; as the RESPECTAct
did, the Fair Play Fair Pay Act states that it would "not confer copyright
protection.., upon sound recordings that were fixed before February
15, 1972.1281 Therefore, the Fair Play Fair Pay Act would leave the
28 2
remaining protections for such sound recordings to state laws,
meaning that even if the Act is adopted, state law would be permitted to
continue to protect pre- 1 972 recordings against unauthorized acts of
reproduction (other than ephemeral recordings under section 11 2(e)),
preparation of derivative works, distribution, performance other than
performances through an audio transmission, and possibly other acts.
Therefore, states that do have a "piracy statute," such as Nevada, could
maintain the statute to a certain extent, as discussed in Part II, Section
C, above.
The pressure to clarify the law as to pre- 1972 sound recordings has
intensified because of cases in which courts are asked to determine
whether a public performance right to pre-1972 sound recordings
exists based on common law. In 2016 the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Second and Eleventh Circuits, and in 2017 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit each certified a question to the highest state courts
in New York, Florida, and California, respectively, asking whether state
law in the three states provides for such a right. 2 83 In December 2016,
the New York Court of Appeals held that there is no common-law
copyright protection for pre- 1972 sound recordings in New York 2 84 ;

278.
279.
280.

See supra note 274.
See supra note 266.
See supra note 274.

281. RESPECTAct, § 2, adding 17 U.S.C. 114(f)(4)(D)(iv); supra note 274.
282. Id.
283. Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 821 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir.
2016); Flo & Eddie, Inc.v. SiriusXM Radio, Inc., 827 F.3d 1016 (1 th Cir. 2016);
Flo & Eddie v. Pandora Media, Inc., 851 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2017).
284. Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 28 N.Y.3d 583 (2016). For a
discussion of the ruling by the New York Court of Appeals, see Tyler Ochoa, A
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in June 2017, the U.S. District Court for the District of Illinois ruled
that there is no state common-law protection available for pre- 1972
sound recordings under Illinois law.2 85 Earlier, in 2014, the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California had interpreted a
California statute to provide for such a right; 28 6 the statute vests "an
exclusive ownership" in pre- 1 972 sound recordings without spelling
out the rights that the ownership comprises. 28 7 The court noted that,
when the California legislature adopted the provision, "there was no
common law rule in California rejecting public performance rights in
sound recording ownership.12 8 8 While litigation has been ongoing, bills
were introduced in Tennessee to address rights in pre-1972 sound
289
recordings in the state.
B. Unfair Competition Claimsfor Violation of Non-U.S. IP Rights
Another area in which state IP law has recently seen remarkable
innovation is unfair competition, which has been explored for tools to
combat so-called "foreign IP theft"-infringements of IP rights
committed outside the United States by foreign companies that
manufacture and/or sell products in the United States. The argument is
that because of foreign IP infringement, such as copyright infringement,
these companies gain an unfair advantage when competing with U.S.
competitors. Because it is difficult and costly to pursue enforcement
actions for such foreign IP infringements, 2 90 U.S. companies look to
state unfair competition law to assist them in fighting such conduct. In
two states, Louisiana and Washington, special unfair competition
statutes have been adopted to address such conduct.

Seismic Ruling Revisited: No Common-Law Public Performance Rights in Pre- 1972 Sound
Recordings in New York-Flo & Eddie v. Sirius, TECHNOLOGY AND MARKETING LAW
Blog (Oct. 1, 2014), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/10/a-seismicruling-on-pre- 1972-sound-recordings-and-state -copyright-law-flo-eddie-v-

sirius-xm-radio-guest-blog-post.htm [https://perma.cc/N2 QQ- 8WU6].
285. Sheridanv. iHeartMedia, Inc., -- F. Supp. 3d -- (N.D. 1I. 2017), 2017 WL
2424217.
286. Flo & Eddie Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. CV-13-5693, 2014, PSG
2014 WL 4725382, P 30, 665, 9 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 22, 2014) (interpreting Cal. Civ.
Code §980(a)(2)).
287. CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(2) (2017).
288. Flo & Eddie Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., P 30, 665, 16. See supra note 256.
289. Legacy Sound Recording Protection Act, S.B. 2187, 2014; Legacy Sound
Recording Protection Act, H.B. 2325, 2016. See supra Part I, Section B for a
discussion of the rights to pre- 1972 sound recordings and the dormant Commerce
Clause.
290. See, e.g., MARKETA TRIMBLE, GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL
ENFORCEMENT (Oxford, 2012); Marketa Trimble, The Multiplicity of Copyright Laws
on the Internet, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA &ENT. L. REv. 339 (2015).
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The special statutes adopted in the two states were only the first
signs of a growing interest in unfair competition as a vehicle to fight
foreign IP infringements. Shortly after the special statutes were
adopted, attorneys general from 36 states sent a letter to the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) in November 2011,291 urging the FTC to
consider taking action at the federal level to prevent foreign IP theft and
unfair competition on U.S. soil that results from such theft. 2 9 2 The
attorneys general pointed out that "[tiheft of intellectual property is
endemic in countries to which [U.S.] manufacturing jobs have been
transferred, '2 9 3 and that "[clompetition is unfairly distorted.., when a
manufacturer gains a cost advantage by using stolen information
technology, whether in its business operations or manufacturing
processes. ' 2 94 The letter by the state attorneys general was followed in
April 2012 by a letter from a group of U.S. Senators supporting the
letter from the attorneys general and requesting that the FTC "use all
the tools at [the FTC's] disposal to fight the theft and use of stolen
American manufacturing information technology (IT) and intellectual
'
property (IP)." 295

The state attorneys general letter mentioned Louisiana and
Washington as the states that had adopted statutes to address the
problem of foreign IP theft. 2 96 Louisiana's 2010 statute makes it
"unlawful for a person to develop or manufacture a product, or to
develop or supply a service using stolen or misappropriated property,
including but not limited to computer software that does not have the
necessary copyright licenses, where that product or service is sold or
offered for sale in competition with those doing business in this
state. '2 97 The Washington statute, adopted in 2011, provides

29 1. Letter from the National Association of Attorneys General to the Federal
Trade Commission Commissioners and the Director of the Bureau of Competition
(Nov.
4,
2011),
http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/signons/FTCA%2 0Enforcement%2 0Final.P
DF [https://perma.cc/3DUU-RDH4].
292. Id. at 2.
293. Id. at 1.
294. Id.
295. U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business & Entrepreneurship, Letter
addressed
to the Federal Trade
Commission
1 (Apr. 2,
2012),
http://www.sbc.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File-id=D977 D22F-8FC44438-BD86-677C770AC87E [https://perma.cc/49M6-4JJT].
296. A similar statute was proposed in NewYork. See S.B. S5089, 2011-2012 S.

(N.Y.
2011),
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2011 /s5089/amendment/original
[https: perma.cc/V78Z-BANS]; see also S.B. S856, 2013-2014 S. (N.Y. 2013),
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2013/s856 [https://perma.cc/55CGMGY8].
297.

LA.STAT.ANN.§51:1427(A)(2010).
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protection in cases in which someone uses "stolen or misappropriated
information technology ' 2 98 "in the manufacture, distribution,
marketing, or sales of the articles or products" 299 The statute defines
"[s]tolen or misappropriated information technology" as "hardware or
software.., acquired, appropriated, or used without the authorization
of the owner of the information technology or the owner's authorized
licensee in violation of applicable law." 300 The Washington statute was
used, for example, in a dispute between Microsoft and the Brazilian
30 1
aircraft manufacturer Embraer.
Because the appeals by the state attorneys general and the U.S.
Senators for a federal-level intervention were unsuccessful, some state
attorneys general turned to their states' general unfair competition
statutes to address the conduct proscribed by the special Louisiana and
Washington statutes. For example, the Massachusetts Attorney General
invoked the Massachusetts state unfair practices statute against a Thai
company that used pirated software and allegedly had an unfair
30 2
advantage when it competed with companies in the United States.
The Massachusetts provision holds unlawful "[u]nfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of
any trade or commerce." 30 3 The State of Massachusetts settled the
dispute and the Thai company paid a civil penalty and agreed not to use
pirated software in connection with trade that affected the State. 30 4 In
California, the Attorney General based an unfair competition lawsuit
against two foreign clothing companies on a California unfair
competition statute that protects, i.a., against "any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice. 30 5 The two clothing companies
were accused of using unlicensed software to produce clothing that was
imported and sold in California; 30 6 the case also settled with the

298. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.330.010(7)(a) (West 2011).

299. Id. at (7)(b). For the definition of an "article or product" see id. at (1).
300. Id. at (7)(a). The definition excludes "hardware or software [that] was not
available for retail purchase on a stand-alone basis at or before the time it was
acquired, appropriated, or used by such a person." Id.
301. Wash. State Office of the Attorney Gen., Washington's New Unfair
Competition Law Protects Local Company from Software Piracy (Apr. 3, 2013),
http://atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/washington-s-new-unfair-competitionlaw-protects-local-company-software -piracy [https://perma.cc/EP9 R-PG 9 P].
302. The Official Website of the Attorney Gen. of Mass., Company Finedfor Using
Pirated Software to Gain Unfair Advantage Over Massachusetts Businesses (Oct. 18,
2012), http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2012/

2012-

10-1 8-narong-seafood-co.html [https://perma.cc/DW56-JLLY].
303. MASS. GEN. LAWSANN. ch. 93A, § 2(a) (West 2017).
304.
305.

Wash. State Office of the Attorney Gen., supra note 301.
CAL. Bus.& PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2012).

306.

Compl. for Injunction and Civil Penalties, The People of the State of
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companies paying a fine.
Of the states that have not adopted a special statute that is
comparable to the Louisiana and Washington statutes mentioned above,
not all have general unfair competition statutes that would be
comparable to the Massachusetts and California statutes. For example,
Nevada's statutes include an Unfair Trade Practices Act, 30 7 which is
30 8
formulated as an antitrust statute; the "Deceptive Practices" Chapter
of the Nevada Revised Statutes focuses on false representation,
deceptive labeling, and other fraudulent and deceptive conduct.
30 9
Additionally, Nevada has a statute entitled "Unfair Trade Practices,"
which addresses only the unauthorized possession of, access to, and
reproduction of a computer program or data stored on a computer and
other unauthorized acts concerning the program or data. 3 10 But no
statute in Nevada covers unfair competition in general. NRS
598.0953(2) mentions "unfair trade practices actionable at common
law," 3 1 1 but the contours of common law in Nevada regarding those
practices are unclear.
Courts ought to determine what common law unfair competition
covers in Nevada; as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
noted, "the tort of unfair competition is extremely flexible, and courts
3 12
are given wide discretion to determine whether conduct is 'unfair'.1
The Court has further pointed out that a claim of unfair competition
needs to include "some grounding in deception or appropriation of
3 13
appellant's property," or simply something "dishonest or unfair.1
The Supreme Court of Nevada referred to state law on unfair
competition in a 1988 decision 3 14 but discussed only common-law
tradename infringement, 3 15 and therefore interpreted the common law
of unfair competition only within a limited scope similar to the scope of
the law of unfair competition under the Lanham Act.
The Nevada legislature discussed the lack of a Nevada general
unfair competition statute, but a proposal for a statute never
materialized. A 1973 proposal included a definition of deceptive trade

California v. Ningbo Beyond Home Textile Co., Ltd. et al., 2013 WL 271542,Jan.
24, 2013, point 10.
307.
308.
309.

NEV. REV. STAT.ANN. § 598A.010 etseq(2017).
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 6 603.04 0.

310. Id.
311.

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 598.0953(2).

312.

Golden Nugget, Inc. v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 828 F.2d 586, 591 (9th Cir.

1987).

313. Id.
314. A.L.M.N., Inc. v. Rosoff, 104 Nev. 274 (Nev. 1988).
315. Id. at 277.
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practices with only a non-exhaustive list of examples of such
practices. 3 16 However, the statute as it was adopted was more
restrictive, making the list exhaustive.3 17 An example in the list that
would have prohibited an "unfair method of competition" in general did
not make it into the final statute. 3 18 The narrowing of the bill might be
explained by the fact that at least some legislators were concerned that
3 19
"the bill would allow harassment of legitimate businessmen.1
Discussions of 1999 amendments to the statute show a detailed caseby-case filling in of gaps left in the definition of deceptive trade
practices in the absence of a general unfair competition clause. 3 20 In the
legislative process a legislator opined that "at some point the Legislature
will need to make a policy statement to the court that common sense
321
deceptive trade practices should be included.1
The lack of a Nevada statute governing either specific or general
unfair competition that would protect companies from unfair
competition by foreign companies infringing IP rights abroad has been
reflected in a report by the National Alliance for Jobs and Innovation,
an "association of concerned manufacturers, associations, academics
and other businesses" that is "committed to ending unfair
competition and stopping the theft and misappropriation of trade
secrets and other IP-protected information.13 22 The July 201 6 report
includes a State Report Card that indicates whether state consumer

316. A.B. 301 (Nev. 1973), Amendment No. 406, 232 ("[A] 'deceptive trade
practice[' .. . shall include the following..
317. A.B. 301 (Nev. 1973), § 9, 1483.
318. A.B. 301 (Nev. 1973), Amendment No. 406, 235 ("Engaging in any act or
practice deemed to be an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act
or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within the meaning of Section
5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act...").
319. A.B. 301, Minutes, Mar. 22, 1973, p. 231.
320. A.B. 431, Assemb. Comm. On Commerce and Labor, Minutes, Mar. 24,
1999, 3 http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/70th1999/Minutes/AM-CMRC990324-ABs431,447,476,492.html [https://perma.cc/NFP6-XM3Z]. See also
Letter from the Nevada Attorney General to Assemblywoman Barbara Buckley, Re
AB 431, Mar. 24, 1999.
321. A.B. 431, S. Comm. on Commerce and Labor, Minutes, May 5, 1999, 12
(reporting
on
an
assertion
by
Chairman
Townsend)
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/70th 1999/Minutes/SM-CL-9 90505Assembly%2 0Bills.html [https://perma.cc/V8NA-2XB4]. Assemblywoman Barbara
Buckley agreed, adding that "the crime list is too narrow." Id.
322. Nat'l All. for Jobs and Innovation, Our Mission (2017), http://naji.org/theissue/our-mission/ [https://perma.cc/VUB9-4FBM]. As of August 22, 2016, the
President of the Alliance was Rob McKenna, who was the Attorney General of the
State of Washington when the special Washington statute that was mentioned
earlier was adopted. Board of Directors, Nat'l All. forJobs and Innovation (2017),
http://naji.org/the-alliance/advisory-board/ [https://perma.cc/UU6Q-KL8Z] (last
visited May 3, 2017).
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protection laws are able to "provide... for enforcement against
companies-including
companies
based
overseas-that
use
misappropriated or stolen IP to seek an unfair competitive
advantage.1 32 3 Nevada received a D on the State Report Card; the
report listed the lack of a "broad unfairness prohibition" as one of the
major deficiencies in Nevada's law. 3 24 Only nine states received grades
325
lower than Nevada.
Enacting a general unfair competition statute in Nevada and other
states that lack such a general statute would seem advisable; a special
statute similar to the Louisiana and Washington model could also be
considered. It should be noted, however, that the application of such
statutes to "foreign IP theft" presents some challenges. Of greatest
importance is that neither the Louisiana statute nor the Washington
statute addresses the choice-of-law issue that arises in such cases-the
question of which country's law a court should apply to evaluate
whether infringement of IP rights has occurred. In cases of "foreign IP
theft" it seems logical that the applicable law should not be U.S. law,
unless U.S. IP law has an extraterritorial reach in the particular
circumstance; 3 26 the established choice-of-law rule for IP infringement
dictates that the applicable law should be the law of the foreign country
for which infringement is claimed. 32 7 A reminder of the choice-of-law
rule in the statute would be useful. 3 28 Other challenges in the

323. Nat'l All. for Jobs and Innovation, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
Under State Consumer Protection Laws 1 (July 14, 2016), http://naji.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016 /07/ PROTECTION-OF-IP-RIGHTS-UNDER-STATECONSUMER-PROTECTION-LAWSNAJ_20 16-07-13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8MYH-U27L].
324. Id. at 3.
325.

Id. at 1.

326. On the extraterritorial reach of IP laws see, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial
Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505 (1997);
Timothy R Holbrook, Extraterritorialityin U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2119 (2008); Marketa Trimble, ExtraterritorialEnforcement of Patent Rights, in
PATENT ENFORCEMENT WORLDWIDE (Christopher Heath ed., Hart Publishing,

2015). When U.S. law has extraterritorial reach and can be applied by a U.S. court,
the rights owner may pursue a claim under U.S. IP law directly.
327. E.g., Itar-Tass Russian New Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82,
91 (2d Cir. 1998) ("On infringement issues, the governing conflicts principle is
usually lex loci delicti, the doctrine generally applicable to torts."). For criticism of the
application of the rule in IP cases see, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie et al., The Law
Applicable to Secondary Liability in Intellectual Property Cases, 42 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 201, 232 (2009) ("A formalistic application of lexloci protectionis, which
flows from strict adherence to the traditional intellectual property principle of
territoriality, fails to grapple explicitly with the problems of overlapping authority
in today's world.").
328. For torts in general, Nevada adheres to the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws. See General Motors Corp. v. EighthJudicial District Court of State
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application of the statutes are evidentiary; it might be difficult to prove
that an infringement occurred in a foreign country, under foreign law,
and that the infringement actually resulted in an unfair advantage in the
3 29
United States.
C. Rights in Unfixed Works
Rights in unfixed works is another area in which state copyright law
might develop; however, not all states have provisions for the
protection of unfixed works. For example, Nevada has no statute that
protects unfixed works. The lack of a provision in Nevada might be
surprising, since a hallmark of Nevada success is the entertainment
industry, and although many performances are recorded, other
performances, including musical improvisations and stand-up comedy,
are often not recorded-at least not recorded by the copyright owner
or with his consent-and therefore are not protected by federal
3 30
copyright law, or are protected in a very limited manner.
Rights in unfixed works have received renewed attention after the
2015 en banc decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Garciav. Google, Inc. 3 3 1 The majority of the court held that Ms. Garcia
did not own copyright to her five-second performance in a film because
(1) her work was not a work within the definition of copyrightable
subject matter 3 3 2 and with the minimal level of creativity or originality
required for copyright protection, 3 33 and (2) even if her performance
were a protectable work, it was not properly fixed in a tangible medium
of expression because it was not Ms. Garcia who fixed the work in the
tangible medium. 3 34 Whether or not one agrees with the Garcia
majority opinion, particularly its second prong, one might ask whether

of Nevada, 122 Nev. 466, 473 (Nev. 2006). Application of the rule to IP
infringements should lead to the application of the law of the country for which

protection is sought.
329. David J. Kappos & Gregory R. Baden, Combating IP Theft Using Unfair
Competition
Law,
N.Y.L.J.,
May
6,
2013,
p.
3,
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/da437057-02f5-4d28-a866-

8d7a27918ead/?context= 1000516.
330. Federal copyright law provides protection for live musical performances
against bootlegging. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2015). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2015).
See infra notes 36 and 83-87 and the accompanying texts for discussions of the
fixation requirement.
331. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
332. Id.at741.
333. Id. at 742. Cf. Judge Kozinski's dissent on the point id. at 749-50.
334. Id. at 743. Cf.Judge Kozinski's dissent on the point id. at 750. See also Laura
A. Heymann, How to Write a Life: Some Thoughts on Fixation and the Copyright/Privacy
Divide, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 825, 842 (2009).
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state law may fill in some of the space that this decision has left open. 335
Live performances, even if they are recorded by the members of
an audience, are not considered fixed for the purposes of the U.S.
Copyright Act merely because of a recording made by an audience
member, and therefore the performances will enjoy no federal
copyright protection. Although federal anti-bootlegging provisions
provide protection for some unfixed performances, they do not cover
recordings of all unfixed performances. 3 36 The provisions target the
unauthorized fixation of live musical performances, the unauthorized
transmission or other communications of live musical performances,
and the distribution of unauthorized phonorecords of live musical
performances. 337 They therefore cover, for example, acts by an
audience member who, "without the consent of the performer," records
a live musical performance on his smartphone, or uses a streaming
service, such as Periscope, 3 38 to stream a live musical performance via a
smartphone, or sells access to an MP3 file with the recording of the
performance. However, the federal statutes do not cover, for example,
non-musical live performances, such as a magic performance that one
magician reproduces from another, 3 39 or a performance that
reproduces someone else's performance, such as performing live
someone else's unfixed musical improvisation.
State law may provide some protection for unfixed works;
depending on the circumstances, the right of publicity, and the laws of
defamation, privacy, contract, unfair competition, and trade secrets may

335. As Jennifer Rothman pointed out, Ms. Garcia originally filed her case in a
state court and included a right of publicity claim and privacy-based claims. See
Jennifer E. Rothman, The Other Side of Garcia: The Right of Publicity and Copyright
Preemption, 39 COLUM.J.L. &ARTS 441, 441-42 (2016).
336. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2015); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(2015). Protection against the
unauthorized fixation of unfixed performances is required by the TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 81, Article 14(1), and by the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, 1996, Article 6(ii). See also the Beijing Treaty, supra note 100,
Article 6(ii). As of Aug. 25, 2016, the United States has not yet ratified the Treaty.
See further infra note 349 and the accompanying text.
337. 17 U.S.C. § I101(a) (2015); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2015). Although 17
U.S.C. § 1101 "explicitly preserves state statutory and common law remedies[ .... ]
the persistence of state remedies is likely to have little practical import." Jane C.
Ginsburg, U.S. Federalism and Intellectual Property, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 463, 475
(1996).
338. Periscope
(Aug.
23,
2016),
https://www.periscope.tv/
[https://perma.cc/T9NM-BH94].
339. In Teller v. Dogge, a foreign magician reproduced in a video the
performance of a magic act by Mr. Teller, a famous Las Vegas magician. Mr. Teller
relied on protection for his act as a dramatic work that was filed with the U.S.
Copyright Office in the form of a script, and on a federal unfair competition claim
under 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) (2015). Teller v. Dogge, D. Nev., 2:12-cv-00591-JCMGWF, docket document No. 1, Apr. 11, 2012.
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be used to fight unauthorized acts concerning unfixed works. 34 0
However, commentators point out that these state laws do not
necessarily cover all instances of unauthorized acts concerning unfixed
works. 34 1 Any remaining holes in the protection may be addressed by a
special state statute. A California statute is an example of a provision
that protects unfixed works broadly; it provides that "[t]he author of any
original work of authorship that is not fixed in any tangible medium of
expression has an exclusive ownership in the representation or
expression thereof as against all persons except one who originally and
independently creates the same or similar work.134 2 This broad
language covers not only unfixed performances, but also any unfixed
works that are performed. In other words, when a musician plays an
improvisation of an unfixed musical composition, the act consists of
two unfixed works-a performance and a musical composition-and
the California statute protects both. The statute does not, however,
protect unfixed ideas-ideas that are not formulated in a work of
3
authorship. 34
Whether or not a special statute, such as California's statute, would
be helpful in another state might be subject to debate. The published
cases do not indicate that the California statute has been used frequently
to protect unfixed works. Some may argue that evidentiary issues in
such cases would be difficult, but that hurdle alone should not
determine whether such a provision should be added to the statutes of
other states. 34 4 The adoption of a general unfair provision in Nevada
(that is discussed in the previous Section) could also improve the
protection for unfixed works.
Some states might rely on common law copyright if courts in the
state have used common law to protect unfixed works. 3 45 Under the

340. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 335, at 442; David W. Melville & Harvey S.
Perlman, Protectionfor Works of Authorship through the Law of UnfairCompetition: Right
of Publicity and Common Law Copyright Reconsidered, 42 ST. Louis L.J. 363, 373-408
(1998); Ginsburg, supra note 337, at 474.
341. Cf. Rothman, supra note 335, at 443 (arguing that the right of publicity
keeps expanding and is "increasingly in conflict" with copyright law).
342. CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(1) (West 2017).
343. On protection of ideas see, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protectionfor
Productsof the Mind: An "Idea" Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV.L. REv. 705 (2006);
Jane C. Ginsburg, 'An Idea Whose Time Has Come" - But Where Will It Go?, 119 HARV.

L. REV. F. 65 (2005).
344. Heymann, supra note 334, at 853 ("IT]he fixed work is the repository for
the author's efforts..."). See also, e.g., in the context of protection of ideas, Miller,
supra note 343, at 731-32 ("Although idea cases can be complicated, fact-driven,
and somewhat evanescent, courts should not bar plaintiffs to save costs by avoiding
difficult evidentiary inquiries and ambiguities.").
345. See supra notes 258-262 and the accompanying text.
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1909 Copyright Act it was the act of publication that controlled
whether federal law provided protection, and with performances not
recognized as acts of publication, works that were "only" performed,
even if publicly performed, were not considered published and were
therefore held to be outside the scope of federal copyright protection.
Courts recognized common law copyright protection, for example, for
a radio
news announcement
about President Kennedy's
34 6 and Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech. 34 7
assassination
States are free to legislate on unfixed works; federal copyright law
does not cover unfixed works 3 4 8 and does not preempt their protection
by state law. One problem for federal law post-Garciais its possible noncompliance with international law. Federal anti-bootlegging provisions,
combined with federal copyright protection, particularly as interpreted
in Garcia, achieve only partial compliance with international
obligations. The WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, to which
the United States is a party, requires that performers be afforded
protection against unauthorized broadcast, communication, and
fixation of their unfixed performances, regardless of whether the
performances are musical or other performances. 3 4 9 The same
requirement also exists in Article 6 of the Beijing Treaty; the Treaty,
350
however, has not yet been ratified by the United States.
V. CONCLUSION

State IP laws, though they are not typically at the core of a state's
innovation policies, are an important component of such policies. Any
state interested in attracting business and innovation and fostering
creativity should review its laws as they relate to IP and consider

346. CBS, Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 248 N.Y.S.2d 809, 813 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1964) ("A public performance in and of itself does not deprive an
unpublished work from the protection accorded at common law and recognized by
the federal Copyright Law.").
347. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211 (1 th
Cir. 1999).
348. On unfixed works as not being "writings" under the IP Clause of the U.S.
Constitution see Craig W. Dallon, The Anti-Bootlegging Provisions:CongressionalPower
and Constitutional Limitations, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 255, 279-88 (2011);
Heymann, supra note 334, at 845-46 and 852-53. On the history of the fixation
requirement in federal lawsee Heymann, supra note 334, at 844-51.
349. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 6, Dec. 20, 1996, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203. For the definition of a "performer"
under the Treaty see id., art. 2(a).
350. Beijing Treaty, supra note 100, art. 6. The Garcia decision puts into
question whether the U.S. Copyright Act plugs some of the holes in the protection
required by the Beijing Treaty. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 751 (9th
Cir. 2015) (en banc) (KozinskiJ., dissenting).
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revisions that would best serve the state's policies and needs.
A deep expert debate should be conducted and a political
determination should be made to consider how state statutes can be
changed to enhance a state's attractiveness for innovators and creators.
Clearly, changes in state IP laws cannot be the only measure; other state
laws and various conditions must be combined to create incentives for
innovators and creators. Sometimes circumstances completely external
to a state's efforts will influence whether a particular business
establishes operations in a state. State IP laws need to enhance, or at
least not detract from, the other factors. Having laws on the books that
have been outdated for a quarter of a century or more 35 1 does not speak
well for a state's focus on innovation and creativity and does not
promote confidence in a state's ability to create and maintain an
environment suitable for innovative businesses.
While it is unquestionable that a state's IP statutes should be kept
current with developments in federal law and the obligations of the
United States under international treaties, it is much more difficult to
assess when and how much a state should engage in legislative
innovation. A trailblazer state statute can set a state apart from other
states and provide a significant competitive advantage over other states.
Nevada certainly has some experience in this regard; its early twentiethcentury divorce law famously created business opportunities in the state
and eventually inspired other states to change their laws. In 2008
Nevada became the first state in the United States to require that data
collectors encrypt sensitive personal data. 3 5 2 In addition to paving the
way for statutes in other states, trailblazer state statutes can also serve
35 3
as test statutes for future federal legislation.
A state's creativity in enacting state IP laws may be restrained by
what some have described as a continuously expanding coverage of
federal IP protection. Commentators have detected a growing influence
of federal law on state law-governed IP issues through the expansion of
the preemption doctrine, 3 54 through amendments of federal statutes to

351. See supra Part 1I, Sections A, B, and C.
352. NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 603A (2017). See StephenJ. Rancourt, Hacking, Theft,
and Corporate Negligence: Making the Case for Mandatory Encryption of Personal
Information, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 183, 207 (2011). A Nevada statute that was
adopted earlier required encryption of customers' personal information. NEV. REV.
STAT. § 597.970 (repealed 2009).
353. Ginsburg, supra note 337, at 479 ("State regulation in territorially discrete
(in theory) 'laboratories,' can offer useful lessons to later federal drafters." Internal
citation omitted.).
354. E.g., Elizabeth Helmer, The Ever-Expanding Complete PreemptionDoctrineand
the Copyright Act: Is This Hhat Congress Really Wanted?, 7(1) N..C.J.L. & TECH. 205
(2005); Tom W. Bell, MisunderstandingDastar: How the Supreme Court Unwittingly
Revolutionized Copyright Preemption, 65 MD. L. REV. 206 (2006).
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cover IP issues previously covered by state law, 3 5 5 and through
interpretations of federal statutes to cover aspects of state-law IP
issues. 3 56 When the federal government moves in the direction of
greater coverage of IP issues under federal law, 3 57 including issues
previously in the states' purview, states may decide to discontinue or
slow significantly their efforts to amend their existing IP statutes or
enact new ones.
There might be good reasons for all IP laws to be subsumed under
federal law. The internet makes the flow of goods, and particularly
intangible goods, harder to confine within the borders of individual
35 9 it
states. 35 8 Although such a confinement may be technically feasible,
is certainly unpopular, and any laws requiring the replication on the
internet of physical territorial limitations are unpopular with businesses
36 0
and consumers who wish to enjoy fully the benefits of the internet.
At the country level, laws that vary state by state are antithetical to
business on the internet, and internet actors' preference for federal law
to govern IP issues is therefore understandable. The same preference
actually applies on the global scale; in the absence of globally-uniform
IP laws, and considering the multiplicity of national IP laws, federal IP
36 1
law is still better than a multiplicity of state laws concerning IP rights.
The fact that international IP law continues to expand is also an
argument for moving toward more complete federal coverage of IP law.
The federal government is responsible for the United States'
compliance with international treaties, and the most effective way to
achieve compliance is to have federal law implement international
treaties. Relying on state legislatures to adopt and maintain laws that are
compliant with international treaties, and relying on judges to interpret
statutes and common law so that state IP law is in accord with

355. See, e.g., protection for post-1972 sound recordings and for unfixed
performances under 17 U.S.C. §1101 (2015). See supra Part 1I, Section C, and Part
ILL, Sections A and C.
356. See, e.g., the decision that the safe harbor for service providers under the
U.S. CopyrightAct applies in cases of pre-1972 sound recordings protected under
state law. 17 U.S.C. §512 (2015); Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d
78 (2d Cir. 2016).
357. See supra Part III, Sections A and C.
358. Cf Marketa Trimble, ExtraterritorialEnforcement of National Laws in
Connection with Online CommercialActivity, in REs. HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC COM.
L. 261 (John A. Rothchild ed., 2016).
359. See, e.g., Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel,supra note 41.
360. See supra Part I, Section B, and Part III, SectionA.
361. See Report from the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 93-983, at
164 (1974) ("Adoption of a uniform national copyright system would greatly
improve international dealings in copyrighted material."). See also Report from the
Committee on the Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 113 (1975).
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international law is problematic; states can and do take a long time to
update their statutes that are in violation of international law, and the
federal government does not always take swift action to persuade a state
to change its law concerning IP rights-absent a court ruling holding
the state statute in violation of an international treaty. For the federal
government to foster relationships with other countries in the area of
IP law, avoid potential WTO panel proceedings for violations of IP laws,
and remain a leader in international negotiations on IP law, the federal
government might prefer to have full control over U.S. IP law.
Notwithstanding all the strong arguments in favor of a move
towards an even greater federalized IP law, at this point the states still
retain many legal tools that can enable them to shape their state legal
environments so as to provide the best conditions possible for local
innovation and creativity. Even those who are the most skeptical about
the effects of law in general, and IP law in particular, might agree that
having state laws on the books that are outdated and preempted by
federal law sheds an unfavorable light on a state's attractiveness for
business. States should comprehensively update their IP-related statutes
to achieve their best possible strategic and competitive advantage.

